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Publishers
Wolfgang Taucher I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
Mathias Vogl I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
Peter Webinger I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, Herrengasse 7, 1014 Vienna; +43-1-53126; post@bmi.gv.at

Editors
Alexander Schahbasi I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
Thomas Schrott I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

Collaborators
Andreas Tiwald, Dina Latek, Gerald Dreveny, Sarah Kratschmayr I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

Layout
Astrid Richter I Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

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Foreword

An increasing number of Somali refugees in Europe led to the need of taking a closer look at the situation in Somalia and the forces at work in this war-torn country. The Country of Origin Information Unit of the Austrian Federal Asylum Office has long focused and closely followed the situation in Somalia and even had an analyst on the ground to assess the situation. Based on this continuous work, we decided to publish this anthology, drawing on the vast expertise of experts from various backgrounds.

Andreas Tiwald, the head Somalia analyst at the Country of Origin Information Unit provides a detailed overview of the current security environment in the country. Markus Höhne, a research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale, Germany, describes the situation of minorities in Somalia. To get a better understanding of migration flows – both legal and illegal – the volume features contributions from Martin Hofmann and David Reichel, both researchers at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), as well as Gerald Tatzgern, head of the Central Service for Combating Human Smuggling/Human Trafficking at the Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service. An in-depth analysis of Al-Shabaab by Alex P. Schmid (Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative, TRI), Nico Prucha (TRI Research Associate), and Matthew Allatin (TRI Research Assistant) adds to the understanding of the structure of this movement and its role in the ongoing power struggle. Roland Marchal, researcher at CERI (a joint research unit of Sciences Po and the CNRS) contributed an introduction and thoughts on the current developments.

This anthology is to serve as a backgrounder for those working in the field of asylum and migration, as well as anyone with an interest in the state of affairs in the country. The book aims at contributing toward a better understanding of Somalia and serves as a sound basis for the analysis of current developments.

Wolfgang Taucher
Director of the Federal Asylum Office
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

Mathias Vogl
Director-General for Legal Affairs
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

Peter Webinger
Deputy Director-General for Legal Affairs
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
Introduction

Roland Marchal

This set of articles intends to provide an overview of conditions that constitute push factors in Somali migrations. The views are those of the authors, not of the institution that publish them. The views expressed here also are not always shared by all authors. Of course, the focus is on political and social oppressions that may justify migrations, while more usual motivations are not considered.

As an academic researching on Somalia for more than two decades, I read them with recurrent questions in mind. Two of them are worth mentioning here. The first question is what would have happened, had the Somali civil war not transformed itself or evolved into a component of this Global War on Terror that reframed the diplomatic agenda after 9/11. The second is whether this crisis is going to end soon or, notwithstanding the impressive resilience of the Somali population, whether this crisis would only be concluded when global parameters change.

The time framework for any analysis is a question that deserves quite some justification. For instance, migrations to overseas in Somalia started long ago and got a significant push after 1973 at the time of the first oil crisis and Somalia’s membership to the Arab League (in 1974). Those migrations followed patterns that were already in place: urban Somalis, better educated than the average population, were trying to find a better living or remit money in the Gulf States. In the early 1980s, those patterns changed drastically, a transformation that was not only connected to the fluctuations of oil prices but also to a new Friendship Agreement with Italy: migrants were no longer in majority from urban background but were people from the countryside or had very recently and for a short period settled in the peripheries of the capital city. The gender balance of those migrants was not as before as females constituted a growing proportion.

To a large extent, the civil war provided further justification for those patterns of migration, except that Europe had made conditions to settle much harder. Italy itself became an ambivalent site for refugees: it was still relatively open but migrants had no access to welfare of any kind, which made their stay increasingly difficult except for women who were willing and able to work for old dependent Italians. As reflected in the analyses provided here by Martin Hofman, David Reichel, and Gerald
Tatzgern, Somalis shifted their habits quite quickly and efficiently tried to settle in northern European countries, UK, and Scandinavian countries.

One should add that Somali migrants were not only challenging “Fortress Europe” since they found their way to Australia, New Zealand, South East Asian countries and, of course, the USA. This would add one more question to those raised by the description provided by the authors: Somalis joke about their nomadic habit and it would be interesting to look at their strategy of resettlement once they have already reached a European/western country...

In those years, the main argument for migration was political coercion and/or social marginality. As Markus Höhne describes in his chapter, the discourse on minorities could be mobilized differently by asylum seekers because indeed the social configuration of the Somali society was much more complex than most foreigners often thought or knew, because indeed people who could not refer to powerful alliances were potential targets for any military entrepreneurs and, eventually also, because protecting minorities resonated positively with western ethics.

There is no study known to this author on whether these reasons for asylum were in all cases justified and supported by hard evidence and it will be interesting to review all those narratives at one point. This is not to say that “minorities” were not potentially easy targets but social bonds were often not restricted to that sole label in the Somali society.

In the 2000s, when Somalia became a playing ground for the Global War on Terror, the situation changed drastically and the motivations for exile had to be framed increasingly in a different way. Those perceived in the earlier period as belonging to “weak clans” or “minorities” in a matter of few years were empowered by a radical Islamic insurgency, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen, a group nowadays affiliated with al-Qaeda.

As a long time watcher of Somalia, my opinion often differs from those making security assessment. Al-Shabaab is first an outcome of a long unresolved civil war where and when the use of violence was no more seen as problematic but as a fact of life. It comes also from the failure to reframe a political agenda by Islamic groups that were less inclined to violence but were nevertheless ostracized by the international community and regional players at the benefit of faction leaders (the poorly named “National Reconciliation conference” from October 2002 to October 2004 being the best illustration of that stance). Connections with al-Qaeda were indeed
an important aspect and a very strong incentive to create al-Shabaab but one should also account the mismanagement by western powers of the covert war in Somalia before 2006 and the paramount effect of the Ethiopian armed intervention in December 2006 until January 2009.

When those events are taken into account, the history of al-Shabaab - as described by most security experts - appears as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Up to the Mogadishu war that took place from February to June 2006, al-Shabaab gathered only a few dozens of militants, had little support in the society and was seen by most Somali Islamists as a very strange brand of Muslims. Yet al-Shabaab got reinforced by the victory of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in June 2006 and launched massive recruitment campaigns up to December 2006 when fighting broke out against the Ethiopian army.

Throughout those months, the international community had problems to understand the controversies within the ICU leadership and the US Administration decided that eventually al-Qaeda was in control of the ICU. Somalis and many foreign experts very much disputed and still dispute this opinion that played down the bitter debates and arguments within the ICU opposing al-Shabaab against most of the others. Had the US and the regional States been more cautious and nuanced in their assessment, a clarification would have taken place and put al-Shabaab where it still was earlier that year: a cluster of ultra-rigorist militants engaged in hit squads with little social bonds.

The Ethiopian intervention with US backing and European blessing transformed that group into the most efficient expression of popular resistance against Ethiopia. The USA and the European Union lost further political capital when they just endorsed the military retaliations by the Ethiopian army against civilians in Mogadishu and elsewhere. This partiality made no sense since it was clear from spring 2007 that Ethiopia and its local ally, the Transitional Federal Government, would be unable to secure the capital city and make the compromise to get most of the population behind them. The TFG President, more than Ethiopia, is to blame for that failure.

When the Djibouti process started in spring 2008, there were different visions of where this could go. The USA and the UN SRSG, Mr Ould Abdallah, had a narrow understanding of who should be the interlocutors in a deal with the TFG that was signed in June 2008 and allowed Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the Chair of ICU Executive Committee to become the new TFG President. By not giving a chance to the other components of the Muqawama (“resistance” as popularly known in Somalia),
they basically reinforced al-Shabaab and provided the conditions for the creation of another less militant but still Islamist armed group, Hisbul Islaam. The broad reconciliation announced by Ould Abdallah ended up being the co-optation of a small Islamist organization, Ahle Sheikh, in the TFG. The reconciliation claimed by the international community was only a better way to wage a war, not the solution to win it or even to end it.

Al-Shabaab over those years had accumulated much sympathy because its members were determined and ruthless in their war against Ethiopia. Nationalism was the basic motivation of those who joined. But its leadership’s ambitions were different, much more tainted by jihad than nationalism framed in religious conservatism of many rank and file members. By May 2009 al-Shabaab controlled more territory and population than any entity or factions that had existed throughout the civil war.

The reason behind the war changed when Sheikh Sharif became the new TFG President in February 2009 but because of the rapid recruitment of al-Shabaab rank and file, it was difficult - except for Western security services - to claim that the movement was completely committed to global jihad. War more than politics was the only item on the agenda.

AMISOM was praised for its victory in Mogadishu and the “expulsion” of al-Shabaab in late July and early August 2011. AMISOM paid tribute to that victory that was not won alone. Other players, not Somalis, were also deeply involved in the fighting. Mid-October 2011, the Kenyan Defense Forces intervened in the border area and eventually took over the city and port of Kismaayo one year later. That port was described as the main economic asset controlled by al-Shabaab. The fall of Kismaayo was believed to bring about the bankruptcy of the jihadi movement. Again, victory was announced before it actually happened.

In the same period, al-Shabaab had by coercion or conviction pushed Hisbul Islaam to merge and claimed to be the only Islamic organization in country. The bombing in Kampala in July 2010 was interpreted by western security experts as an illustration of its global jihad agenda, while Somalis and some academics saw it as a confirmation that indeed the war was getting regional since Ugandan troops were at the forefront in Mogadishu to reduce al-Shabaab influence.

At no point in those years were the UN, the African Union, and the European Union or individual States willing to go beyond ideological statements and check whether al-Shabaab rank and file shared the same agenda as their leaders. At no point
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in those years, were there any attempts to engage al-Shabaab on its ambitions. The international community was full of confidence that al-Shabaab would be defeated and eventually split because of the many differences that were heard from within the core leadership.

Again, the international community was unable (or better said, unwilling) to address the consequences of its own policy. Al-Shabaab had never been a Marxist-Leninist organization: differences and contradictions were palpable from the very birth of that group and its decentralized nature was emphasizing those disagreements and nuances. In particular, various rumors entertained the idea that there was a nationalist faction that was opposed to an internationalist one.

Recent events in June 2013 underline the naivety of this view. In June 2013, the current leader (and labelled internationalist) Ahmed Godane, got rid of several leaders of the other faction. The problem is that among those latter and very prominently, were people known for the international jihadi commitment such as Ibrahim Afghani and Mukhtar Roboow whose eulogy of Ussama ben Laden was not especially “nationalistic”... Even Hassan Daher Aweys today in Somali government custody in Mogadishu has not accepted to cut the ideological bonds with al-Shabaab though he is eager to criticize the “deviation” of its leader.

The war in Somalia is an international war: whoever landed at Mogadishu airport would see “the green zone” populated by UN, AMISOM and many non-official operatives. Having a nationalist agenda at this stage does not imply to get rid of foreign fighters as any Somali groups would need more manpower, expertise and know-how while confronting African professional armies and western special forces. The very ideological question of jihad cannot be resolved in that context.

A side effect of the military dynamic over the last two years has been to reshape that organization. First, al-Shabaab is today closer to the description made by western security services long before facts supported it: al-Shabaab is more connected to AQAP and al-Qaeda “Central” and the emergence of new and younger commanders made the call for global jihad stronger within the movement. Second, al-Shabaab lost territory and many members who were killed or defected to the government side. But these setbacks do not have as much importance in weakening al-Shabaab as before because the forms of war have changed: there is no more a frontline as such, the war is nowadays entirely asymmetric and terror tactics more mobilized in urban contexts than ever before.
Al-Shabaab lost city centers but hardly the control of the countryside. Often, it has been able to reconnect with business people in cities nowadays under AMISOM and Somali government control. Moreover, it still keeps significant portions of territory in the Jubbaland, Bakool, Galgaduud, and Bari regions in its sole and undisputed control. It has secure supply lines and in the current configuration can keep fighting for years.

Mid-March 2013, it proved able to restart terror activities in the capital city to the extent that land price has fallen down and that diaspora and foreign investors are nowadays procrastinating further involvement. This should be understood as a clear message: we get into a long war and the military strategy followed for years by the international community (not to say the West, not to say the USA) might only limit itself to sole containment, if security services in the region keep being able to stop all attempts made by al-Shabaab to undertake a major operation.

Why do Western countries stick on this risky policy? Many European diplomats would answer by stating that on this issue it is better not to contrast with Washington. None that such a policy should be reviewed and, if necessary, amended. But the often heard answer would be to blame the new government that came out from the election of Hassan Sheikh Mahamuud as President in September 2012.

AMISOM is critical for some good and quite bad reasons; in particular, it is well known in Mogadishu that Ugandan leading officers were very disappointed that Sheikh Sharif was not elected, which cut business opportunities for them. Hassan Sheikh made his public campaign and was elected by the National Federal Parliament though he unambiguously stated that federalism as described in the draft constitution was not the solution but the most likely way to create new conflicts. Recent developments indicate that Hassan Sheikh campaigned for a decentralized - though unitary - state. The very recent Kismaayo agreement gives some flesh to that claim.

Hassan Sheikh is also blamed for bad relations with Puntland at a time this latter’s President has only one argument to keep power: his hostility against Mogadishu. Observers should pay more attention to the internal situation in Puntland to better balance the various claims. This remark has also value for Somaliland where Issaq clans that used to be less than enthusiastic about secession are today at the forefront of the critics of the current cabinet because it is engaged in talks with Mogadishu. Politics in Somalia is still understood as a zero sum game.
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This is typically the mistake by the Mogadishu government on Kismaayo. The issue of Jubbaland can be seen different ways, not only as a Hawiye/Daarood competition for new lands and economic assets. Would Greece accept easily Turkish peace keepers without formulating different conspiracy theories? Clearly the SFG mismanaged the issue of Jubbaland but one should acknowledge that it raised valid questions that deserve better answers than those provided by Kenya under the presidency of Mwai Kibaki.

All in all, the new government is still constrained by the same shortcomings and problems as the previous one but it would be hard to blame the new cabinet for that since only the international community believed that the roadmap concluding the Djibouti process has been a success. Corruption, lack of skills and political experience, changing regional parameters and the old Somali problems are still around and make state building a daunting task.

These remarks surely are too short to shed a different light on events that are not so well known. At least, they should make readers aware that Somalia is changing though war and insecurity are still paramount realities. Those remarks may also push a few readers to reflect more on policies that contributed to reshape al-Shabaab as a more viable, not less resilient, organization. Maybe, at one point it would become acceptable to envision other options than to keep the purely security policy enforced now for nearly one decade in Somalia with not so impressive results.

Roland Marchal is a researcher at CERI - a joint research unit of Sciences Po and the CNRS - in Paris/France.
The Security Situation in Somalia

Andreas Tiwald

Introduction

This article intends to reflect the current security in all the different parts of Somalia, which are controlled by approximately 16 major players. The main goal is to illustrate the different degrees of stability regarding the security situation. Additionally, it is intended to clarify that is no option to label Somalia’s security situation black, white or even gray, but much rather to analyze the different shades covering the country. Consequently, a stabilization assessment will be made at the end of the article.

As many international journalists going to Somalia were caught by a wave of enthusiasm, this article mainly relying on the assessment of specialists as well as on Somali media. Some of the materials used for this article are confidential and therefore some sources had to be marked as anonymous.

Military Situation

This year, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has reached its full-authorized strength of 17,731. Overall, there is no change regarding the situation that the Somali government and other forces fighting al Shabaab (AS) strongly rely on the troops of AMISOM and several thousand troops of the Ethiopian government based in Somalia. It is unthinkable that areas could be held without this international effort to fight the Islamist insurgents. Although the Somali president Mohamed has declared that he envisages the withdrawal of the African Union (AU) force within two years, this timeline remains questionable. As Peter Klansoe from the Danish Refugee Council states in an interview: It is not the Somali National Army (SNA) who is in control of areas and locations in South-Central Somalia; it is the Ethiopian and AMISOM forces.

Amison (North), SNA and Ethiopian controlled areas

The “northern” part of AMISOM covers the mission sectors 1, 3 and 4. In addition, several thousand soldiers of the Ethiopian army are manning garrisons and
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positions in sectors 3 and 4. This contingent acts on its own behalf and is not part of AMISOM.

One of the major challenges in recent weeks and months was the wish of the Ethiopian government to draw its troops back to the border areas. Although this has been demanded by the Ethiopian authorities for quite some time, their intentions to withdraw troops appear to be for economic reasons: Since they are not part of AMISOM, they have to finance most of their own expenditures. The troops are supplied with food from the local Somali markets, but the market does not accept the Ethiopian Birr but only US Dollars. Ethiopia does not possess large amounts of foreign currency.

In the past, SNA as well as AMISOM were not prepared to take over the Ethiopian positions, but currently they are being handed over one by one. AMISOM is prolonging the deployments as they strive to maintain their roughly 9,000 troops concentrated as long as possible. This tactic as well as the Somali Government’s unwillingness to accept the Ethiopian wish of troop withdrawal has led to the loss of Xudur (Bakool region). The city was an Ethiopian outpost in an area controlled by al Shabaab from February 2012 until 18 March 2013. On that day, and after several announcements to do so, the Ethiopians left the town, particularly frustrated over the non-reaction of the powers in Mogadishu. The convoy going northwards not only included Ethiopian soldiers but also a number of government officials, local militias and their entourage. Al Shabaab was monitoring this development quite closely and therefore it was not surprising when hundreds of their fighters entered Xudur just hours after the Ethiopian army left. Since then, AS has been trying to keep tensions high in the Bakool region, as indicated by attacks on troops near Ceel Barde.

The military options of AMISOM are limited as a result of the event in Xudur and following the replacement of the Ethiopians by AMISOM in other garrisons. These new expansions of its own area of control in addition to the slow influx of better trained and equipped SNA troops will narrow its possibilities for further offensive action against al Shabaab. Consequently, it is unlikely that AMISOM (North) will significantly expand its territory – and thereby the territory under control of the Somali government – in the near future. There is no doubt about the ability of AMISOM and SNA to eradicate AS in other areas as well. The problem is, however, the follow-up to an offensive, particularly the filling of an emerging power vacuum. This step requires manpower, which is not available at the time. However, providing security
is crucial to receive the support of the local population. This experience was made in Belet Weyne, Baidoa, Luq, Merka, Jowhar, Afgoye, Kismayo and Afmadow, as well as all other locations under the control of AMISOM and SNA in South/Central Somalia.

Generally, it has to be emphasized, that AS is not able to regain the control of cities that are under control of either AMISOM/SNA or Ethiopian troops – as long as the latter keep on manning their positions. In this part of Somalia, the general attitude of the population towards AMISOM is – at the very least – not negative and in the best case very supportive.

More recently Bay and Bakool regions especially have experienced a spike in clashes. It is unknown whether these attacks are mainly initiated by anti-AS forces – are leading up to another advance, although this does not seem to be realistic. What is known is the fact that both AMISOM as well as the Somali government are absolutely dependent on Ethiopian forces in these two regions and in Hiiraan in order to keep al Shabaab at bay.

**Military Situation: AMISOM (South) and militias operating in ‘Jubbaland’**

A quite different picture – of course under different circumstances – is emerging in the sector 2 of AMISOM. After months of standstill, the Kenyan forces and their Somali allies, mainly the Raskamboni, have begun to advance slowly, their new target likely being Jilib. Internal confrontations mentioned further below, have hindered further advances.

Until recently, the Kenyan AMISOM troops in the southern part of ‘Jubbaland’ were bound to their garrisons. 2,500 of the 4,000 Kenyans are currently manning Kismayo Port and the town’s two airports (800 troops) as well as Afmadow and Dhobley (half a battalion each), while 900 are taking part in the aforementioned advance on Jilib. Some 700 more are assigned to the contingent’s HQ at the border.

But the Kenyans struggle to secure their supply routes – each convoy has to be escorted by approximately 150 troops. The current situation in Kismayo makes it seem very unlikely, that there will be further progress in gaining new areas from AS in the near future. Nearly all of the Kenyan AMISOM-troops are irreplaceable in their positions. At the same time, the allied and “not-so-allied” militias are caught in the political and military turmoil regarding the creation of ‘Jubbaland’, which will be discussed later.
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If the recent deployment of a battalion of new Sierra Leonean AMISOM troops will bring any new development to sector 2 of AMISOM (Middle and Lower Jubba), will be seen. However, this is unlikely, as the Sierra Leoneans are not only new to the mission, but also to the Horn of Africa in general. The general intention is the replacement of a Kenyan AMISOM-battalion – the overall numbers of AMISOM in the sector will remain unchanged.27

As far as the northern part of ‘Jubbaland’, namely the Gedo region, is concerned, there are around 1,500 Kenyan troops available.28 They man positions in the districts of Baardheere, Ceel Waaq and Bulo Xawo. In addition, there are Ethiopian troops in the districts of Luuq, Garbahaarey and Doolow. Overall, there will not be much development taking place in this area, as the Ethiopians are not willing to expand and the other anti-AS-forces (including Kenya) are not able to do so.29

Security Situation in the different parts constituting Somalia

The Status of al Shabaab and individual security on AS-held territory

Most analysts agree that the internal fracture of al Shabaab is deepening. Recently, this fracture was displayed when the AS-leadership ordered the assassination of two high-ranking AS-members.30 Until now, the anti-AS forces have not been able to take advantage of this. To the contrary, to prove his power and leadership, one of the measures that might be taken by AS-leader Ahmad Abdi Aw Muhammad Godane (alias Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr) is an increase in asymmetric warfare, especially in Mogadishu.31

On the other hand, the loss of Kismayo Port has led to a loss of valuable economic resources, which since January 2013 has been illustrated by a 50 percent cut in wages for AS-fighters.32 The fact that Mukhtar Robow, member of the Rahanweyn-Clan and one of the most important leaders of AS, was able to escape from this „mopping-up“ could finally lead to a real fracture, as thousands of AS-fighters belong to the Rahanweyn too.33

But al Shabaab was able to gather hundreds of troops for the capture of Xudur, while at the same time another few hundred AS-fighters led a major attack on the town of Awdiinle.34 This ensured its enemies that rumours about a drastic cut in mobility and effectiveness of al Shabaab’s fighting machinery were precipitate.36 Although the group is not able to recapture lost cities, as previously mentioned, the group is still the “most powerful native actor”37 on Somali soil.
The main forces of AS are concentrated along the Jubba valley (3,000), in the Bay and Bakool regions (1,000-2,000) and in the wider Mogadishu area (1,500) while the northern front vis-à-vis to Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) is only manned by a mere 500-800 fighters.

One thing concerning the internal security in AS-held territory is clear: the code of conduct is defined by the clans – if locally powerful – and by an interpretation of "shariah law". Anyone outside the scope of these protective shields faces the permanent risk of being targeted at will by the Islamists. The attitude of core cadres of AS were highlighted by IHS Jane’s:

"[They are not] troubled by the increasingly radical tactics being employed by the group, and their questionable legitimacy under sharia. (…) [They] have argued that each man is responsible for his own actions, that commanders who order unlawful attacks will be judged by God, and therefore the Shabab should not be defined or judged on the actions of a few." 

Following the defeats during the past year, the military pressure on AS has led the Islamists to put pressure on the civilian population in areas under their control. Arbitrary arrests, accusations of spying and executions have since been on the rise.

Southern Somalia: The issue of Federalism

It is less the struggle against al Shabaab that nowadays troubles security analysts concerning the future of Southern Somalia because AS is a known factor and there are strategies to deal with them. All strategies concerning al Shabaab depend on the stability of the government in Mogadishu and on the premise that no further conflicts escalate into armed conflicts on a larger scale. Taking this into consideration it is the question of federalism in Somalia – and especially in ‘Jubbaland’ – what worries analysts.

Their worries circle around the creation of an autonomous region named ‘Jubbaland’, which is comprised of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and Gedo, despite the fact that none of these regions are fully cleared of al Shabaab. The mobilization of forces against al Shabaab in the area was strongly influenced by the promise of the predecessor of the new Somali government, that autonomy would be granted. But after the new government and the president had taken power in Mogadishu in September 2012, they immediately began to undermine all activities concerning a federal structure of a future Somali state. They tend towards a unitary, centralized state.
was not only a step alienating Ethiopia, Puntland, Galmudug and Kenya, but also the loose alliance that was already in the state of forming structures for ‘Jubbaland’. This alliance is mainly based on the Raskamboni, a fighting force that is backed and financed by Kenya, and strongly relies on the Darod/Ogadeni Clan.44 It is the Raskamboni who control most of the parts of Lower and Middle Jubba (including the city of Kismayo) that have been freed by themselves and the Kenyan forces.

In the course of the ‘Jubbaland’ state formation conference in Kismayo (February-May 2013), the leader of the Raskamboni, (in)famous warlord Ahmed Madobe, was elected as the president of ‘Jubbaland’ on 15 May 2013.45 This development as well as the establishment of ‘Jubbaland’ was not recognized by the government in Mogadishu, which organized a parallel ‘Jubbaland’ conference in the capital in February 2013.46

While the autonomous ‘Jubbaland’ elected Madobe as president, the similarly (in)famous warlord Barre Hiraale introduced himself as an opposition-president for the region, as did four other local ‘entrepreneurs’.47 Hiraale’s force of an estimated six hundred fighters infiltrated Raskamboni’s Kismayo in time and is said to control parts of the city. Hiraale is backed and financed by the government in Mogadishu, which he consults on a regular basis.48

At the time of this “twin-election”, thousands of Kismayo residents temporarily fled the town in fear of fighting between the two factions after a previously small-scale exchange between the two occurred.49 The situation partly reflects past contests for power in Kismayo, especially between the Ogadeni (now bound to the Raskamboni) and the Marehan (now split up between Hiraale, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa in Gedo and the Juba Defence Force50 – until now some kind of an ally for both, Kenya and the Raskamboni) while the other inhabitants of the Regions (Hawiye and Bantu) have been mostly excluded. Even more worrying than this déjà vu of clans struggling out of political and economic interests to get a grip on Kismayo is the assessment, that the government in Mogadishu would rather have al Shabaab than Madobe govern Kismayo. This assessment includes the alarming opinion that the Somali government would not hesitate to escalate the political conflict to an armed one,51 and the question of Kismayo could easily reignite the Somali conflict.52

Madobe’s dependence on Kenya, which is providing not only financial resources and hardware but also propaganda, could be seen as positive, as it puts the ‘Jubbaland’ ‘president’ in a position where he is not free to decide on Raskamboni’s actions.53 On the other hand, the Kenyan involvement with Madobe and their parallel
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Obligation as part of AMISOM to serve the Somali government has already started to create further tensions.\textsuperscript{54}

Not surprisingly, al Shabaab was increasing its activities in Kismayo in April and May 2013 while restricting activities in the remaining parts of the Jubba and Gedo regions.\textsuperscript{55} This is an obvious step to take advantage of the government’s misery.

As mirrored in a recent fact-finding mission report by Denmark and Norway, the security situation in Kismayo was described by the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) as having improved in the first months of 2013 and the town returning to normal activity. People are said to have returned in large numbers – even from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. In the report, UNDSS names the threat posed by the different militias.\textsuperscript{56} Major clashes between the militias of Madobe and Hiraale took place in June 2013. 71 people were killed, 300 were wounded. Thousands fled the town.\textsuperscript{57}

Data collected by a security analysis unit highlight the fact that Kismayo is on the brink of disaster, with the number of incidents of armed clashes rising (four in April, four in the first week of May 2013).\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Numbers of security incidents in Kismayo 10/2012-5/2013} \textsuperscript{59}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Security incidents in Kismayo & \multicolumn{7}{|c|}{2012} \\
\cline{2-8}
 & O & N & D & J & F & M & A \\
\hline
Internal Clash & o & o & o & o & o & o & o \\
\hline
Clash with AS & o & o & o & o & o & o & o \\
\hline
Explosive Device & o & o & o & o & o & o & o \\
\hline
Assassination & o & o & o & o & o & o & o \\
\hline
Hand Grenade & o & o & o & o & o & o & o \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Impact of the ‘Jubbaland’ issue on other entities

The impacts of this “betrayal” committed by the Somali government on the Federal cause and within the constitution are clearly not limited to the ‘Jubbaland’ issue.\textsuperscript{60} The shift in government policy escalated tensions with other established or proposed autonomous regions,\textsuperscript{61} already labelled by the BBC as “self-governing regions, many of them hostile to the central government.”\textsuperscript{62}
First of all, the government of Puntland strongly opposes the change in mind of the government in Mogadishu. It is not only their own cause that has led them to oppose centralism, but it is also their clan-relationship with the Darod of ‘Jubbaland’. This is why president Farole of Puntland welcomed the election of Ahmed Madobe as president of ‘Jubbaland’ and further promotes the southern region nationally and internationally. It is the arbitrary interpretation of the Somali constitution concerning federalism that was part of the decision of Puntland to not take part in the last London Conference on Somalia.

In addition to those political tensions with Puntland, the Somali government is alienating the leadership of Galmudug, which is trying hard to expand its ability to govern. Mogadishu is definitely unhappy with the president of Galmudug, Abdi Hasan Awale ‘Qeybdiid’. Similarly, the Somali government is disappointed with the leadership in Hiiraan (Shabelle Valley State), and nominated a new governor as they did for the Gedo region claimed by ‘Jubbaland’. Meanwhile, the long gone Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was brought back to life by warlord Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade, justifying the step with the marginalization of the Rahanweyn areas. He seems to aim at the creation of an autonomous Rahanweyn state and is said to collaborate and coordinate himself with president Madobe of ‘Jubbaland’. President Farole of Puntland seemingly is not antipathetic, saying: “I encourage other regions, such as Bay and Bakool and the central regions, to establish federated states so that the Somali federal system may be completed.”

Overall, as IHS Jane’s states, the government should urgently “reconsider its current centralizing strategy to avoid the risk of fuelling the prevailing feelings of disenchantment”, especially among non-Hawiye clans. By following their centralizing project, the government is fuelling potential conflicts and creating problems, it was meant to resolve. But for now, there is a deadlock, with Somali Prime Minster Abdi Farah Shirdon stating, that there is no other way and nothing to negotiate on.

Long-time Somalia expert Michael Weinstein assesses the policy of centralism of the Somali president: “Hassan’s strategy is obviously high risk and high stakes. In his best-case scenario, Hassan prevails in each south-central region and Puntland is faced with the option of compromising its autonomy or separating from south-central Somalia. Short of the best case for Hassan, “Somalia” becomes irretrievably fragmented and balkanized, or its territories become a mixture of uncoordinated regional and local forms of administration.”
What is evident at the moment is that all mentioned movements and governing groups, claiming or trying to create autonomous territories within Somalia clearly oppose al Shabaab. There is no indication that any of those groups will ally themselves with al Shabaab or tend to become an Islamist group.75

**Mogadishu and the ‘freed’ parts of the Shabelle regions**

The overall security situation for the population in Mogadishu is improving, according to different sources in a Norwegian/Danish Fact Finding Mission Report dated May 2013.76 This affects the central districts, the West and the harbor area. The freedom of movement has dramatically improved as illegal checkpoints have been removed, while the only remaining ones that are manned by the SNA.77 People are continually returning to Mogadishu from the IDP-camps in the Afgoye Corridor and other Somali regions as well as from the diaspora.

Street lights have been installed, complains are filed with the police, and garbage collection and street cleaning activities were run up. Investments are made and traditional festivals re-emerge on the calendar.78 Many other signs of normality indicate the significant increase in security that has taken place in Mogadishu within the last year. A security analysis unit acknowledges a “relative consolidation of control of SNG [Somali National Government]/AMISOM forces over Mogadishu and its surroundings.”79

The danger of different militias gaining momentum in the Somali capital, feared by some experts back in 2012,80 is over.81 Warlord- and DC82 -militias are diminishing, with only one left in the district of Medina,83 the presence of police is increasing, partly because of the incorporation of militias of the different DCs.84 The police react to criminal acts and every offense can be registered – although the success rate is still low.85 Consequently, the police are not cheered by the population, but nevertheless tolerated.86 However, it has to be noted, though that people do not fear the police anymore. Sources in the Danish/Norwegian report claim that there is no abuse or persecution of certain groups per se, although IDPs are still regarded as being vulnerable.87

In addition, courts have been established in the districts. Both the AU and the UN have enforced their establishment. Even in Merka a court has already opened.88 Despite of claims of corruption,89 the crowded courts90 indicate that the people are eager to let the judicial system run its course.
On the other hand, the al Shabaab’s presence in the Somali capital has been stronger ever since its drawback from the city. Their numbers are said to be 1,500 inside the city, out of which some 300 are members of the Amniyat.91 Many operatives have been able to infiltrate the security forces as well as the National Security Agency (NSA),92 which has led to assassinations of members of those institutions. Even agent controllers of the NSA are liquidated on the streets of Mogadishu.93 Generally, the level of assassinations is quite high at the time of writing, with twenty incidents reported in Mogadishu within four weeks.94

Another threat to security forces, especially to police stations and smaller army deployments are hit-and-run attacks carried out by a number of 30-40 AS-operatives, who only gather immediately in advance of the attack and disperse after a short fire-fight.95 Furthermore, deserters are additional targets for assassinations. Similarly to members of the security forces, their risk to be hunted down – especially by Amniyat agents – is rising, not only for higher-level defectors but also for simple foot soldiers trickling to Mogadishu from other regions.96 This increase of assassinations is also likely to be based on the above-mentioned need for AS-leader Godane to show strength and leadership.

Civilians are most affected by hand grenade attacks as well as by other explosive devices. Although there is a priority for AS to target security forces and government institutions,97 there are bomb attacks targeting civilians on a regular basis. While nearly every attack using explosive devices was quite linear in the past, some more recent ones tend to show sophisticated patterns as familiar from Kabul or Baghdad, but foreign to Mogadishu in the past.98 It is unknown to which extend al Shabaab is able to shift further resources to those complex attacks, due to their costs.99 On the other hand, Islamist’s capacity to plant explosive devices, as done in the past, vanishes.100 This development is credit to the increasing presence of security forces and the similarly increasing willingness of the population to report suspicious activities.

However, in context with the show of force by AS mentioned further above, there could be an increase in the frequency of attacks and assassinations.101

The lack of discipline and human rights abuses in Afgooye after it was captured by SNA and AMISOM was mainly a result of the deployment of untrained Somali security forces. As a result, AMISOM intervened several times and the Somali side’s reaction has been multiple executions of perpetrators by court-martial rulings. In addition, the elite force ‘Alpha Group’ was deployed to Afgooye for half a year. Con-
sequently, the situation in the town has drastically improved.\textsuperscript{102}

After their takeover through SNA and AMISOM, similar problems arose in Jowhar and Merka. In Merka, a spike in human rights violations committed by Somali security forces was noted. Since March 2013, the situation in those towns has slowly improved.\textsuperscript{103}

In addition to this, the overall security situation concerning attacks by al Shabaab in the cities of the Shabelle regions freed by AMISOM and SNA, has improved rapidly during the first months of 2013.\textsuperscript{104}

**Security forces**

The police forces of the Somali government now numbers around 6,000 men and women,\textsuperscript{105} of which 5,388 officers (the majority on duty in Mogadishu) receive stipends from the UNDP that are financed by Japan and the European Union.\textsuperscript{106}

Training missions in Djibouti are held on a regular basis, with officers being sent back to Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{107} There are also two-month-training sessions in the Somali capital, partly conducted by the police wing of the AMISOM troops made up of 150 AU police officers. Each of those training units is comprised of 200 police officers, a number showing that the full upgrade of the National Police Force will take its time – although these developments show the overall progress.\textsuperscript{108} The government of Japan provides the financial resources for training and equipment for the police, adding to the increase in professionalism.\textsuperscript{109}

A rather new development is the creation of Special Forces within the security apparatus. One of those is the so-called ‘Alpha Group’ (gaashaan) based at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde Airport.\textsuperscript{110} These troops were trained by a PSC and are said to be paid by US-sources.\textsuperscript{111} In May it was announced by the government that it intended to deploy a special police force to Mogadishu, comprised of 1,300 better trained and equipped regarding personnel.\textsuperscript{112} It is however unknown, if this plan has been put into action. The same applies regarding the deployment of a ‘Mogadishu Security Brigade’ that is said to be made up of 800-1,000 carefully selected and professionally trained soldiers of the SNA.\textsuperscript{113} If both deployments were implemented, this would be a big push towards permanent security for the people of Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{114}

The police force in Mogadishu and Afgooeye is comparatively organized, a fact, mainly based on the deployment of better trained and equipped personnel – a difference to the situation within the first few months in Merka and Jowhar.\textsuperscript{115} Ne-
The Security Situation in Somalia

Vertheless, there are internal clashes within the security forces registered on a regular basis that are possibly related to unpaid salaries.116

A different approach is taken towards the Somali National Army (SNA), where the better trained and equipped parts of the troops occupy positions on the frontline. These battle-hardened soldiers make up only two brigades or around 2,000-2,300 of the overall 10,000117 -12,000118 forces of the SNA, that are said to be funded by a US-sponsored program.119 Another 7,000120 -9,000121 fighters are said to be ‘government forces’ or “militias not formally integrated into the military”,122 although these encompass all of the possibly or likely loyal units and smaller allies scattered in South/Central Somalia. As the Somalia expert Matt Bryden puts it: “Outside Mogadishu, in the near-term, the government has little choice but to negotiate command and control arrangements with local forces, providing them with logistical support, financial support and legitimacy in exchange for a degree of loyalty.”123

The two better brigades mentioned above are used most of the time in tandem with AMISOM, be it at the commanding or platoon level. Many of those troops have undergone their training – including human rights issues – with AMISOM or with the EUTM in Uganda, and afterwards they were put into mixed-clan units. Currently, additional troops are being trained by the EUTM in Uganda, while the training mission is now establishing a new branch in Mogadishu, responsible for the training of higher levels of command. This step is urgently needed, as the existing lack of command and control capacities is hampering the army.124 In addition to the EUTM, the Somali government signed an agreement on military cooperation with Turkey in 2013, which included training and assistance.125

A crippling element for the SNA is the fact that there is hardly any chance to get rid of untrained and sometimes unreliable personnel, including “clan militia with questionable loyalty.”126 This majority of soldiers is dragged alongside or put in hinterland garrisons, that is if they follow orders at all. Besides the circumstance that the SNA still does not have enough trained personal to cover its tasks, there is always the fear of disbanded troops either joining AS or engaging in criminal activities – taking with them their weapons, originally provided by the Somali government.127

Both those options were already taken advantage of by deserters, who left the SNA after having not been paid for months. This problem was addressed and wages are now being paid more regularly. In addition, with an increasing establishment of
barracks the rate of desertion has dropped significantly.\textsuperscript{128}

Finally, a lack of clan-mixture concerning the SNA is affecting the acceptance within the population and fostering mistrust. Still, the majority of troops are from the Hawiye, a fact that e.g. the administrations of Puntland and Khatumo are complaining about.\textsuperscript{129} IHS Jane’s analysis in this context: “The importance of clan rivalry in Somalia is not so much how much power each clan has, but rather how much power it has in relation to its clan rivals.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{Security Incidents – Statistics (Mogadishu) 1/2012-4/2013}\textsuperscript{131}

“In the first four months of 2013, civilian casualties treated in the four main referral hospitals in Mogadishu decreased by 33 per cent, compared with the same period in 2012, according to the World Health Organization.”\textsuperscript{132}

To illustrate the number of incidents, some statistics are provided below. All of them originate from a security analysis unit that services NGOs.\textsuperscript{133} As previously mentioned, the number of incidents related to explosive devices and concerning direct-armed clashes has dropped, while the number of attacks with hand grenades and assassinations remain stagnant.

The overall improvement led the UNDSS to lower the previously given risk levels of ‘Unacceptable Risk’, and ‘Very High Risk’ for all 16 districts of Mogadishu to ‘High Risk’ and even ‘Medium Risk’.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Assassination attempts}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Assassination attempts</th>
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<td>Target killed</td>
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<td>Target wounded/unhurt</td>
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Concerning assassinations, it is worth mentioning, that the UNDSS has stated that perpetrators could be anyone, who can afford to pay for an assassination. The assessment of UNDSS is that al-Shabaab is responsible for approximately three quarters of the targeted killings in Mogadishu.135

### Hand grenade attacks

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<tr>
<th>Number of hand grenade attacks</th>
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<td>Unsuccessful</td>
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### Explosive devices

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<th>Number of Explosive devices</th>
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The Security Situation in Somalia

Security Incidents – Shabelle Regions

“More than 10,000 people were assisted to return to their home areas so far in 2013. People mainly moved from Gaalkacyo, Mogadishu, and Somaliland to Baidoa in Bay, Afgooey and Wanla Weyne districts in Lower Shabelle and Balad and Jowhar districts in Middle Shabelle.”

As in Mogadishu, an obvious decrease of incidents of direct-armed clashes or involving explosive devices can be noted for Afgooey. On the other hand, problems concerning assassinations and hand grenade attacks still exist.

Security incidents in Afgooey 6/2012-4/2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clashes and explosive devices Afgooey</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clash (with AS and internal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J J A S O N D J F M A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosive device</td>
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In Merka, the overall situation concerning security incidents has dramatically improved.\textsuperscript{138}

### Security incidents in Merka 9/2012-4/2013

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<th>Security incidents in Merka</th>
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<td>Internal Clash</td>
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<td>Clash with AS</td>
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<td>Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
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<td>Hand Grenade</td>
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Jowhar town was in general far less affected by security incidents and is safer than the other freed cities.\textsuperscript{139} The number of incidents of all kinds never exceeded five per month. This might be closely connected with the fact, that the population in the area has never been too supportive of al Shabaab.\textsuperscript{140}

### Going Northwards: Baidoa and its main roads

The city of Baidoa was captured by Ethiopian troops in February 2012. For quite a long period, it was surrounded by AS territory. The road connecting it to similarly Ethiopian-held Luuq has been under constant threat. For now, AMISOM and the SNA managed to fight their way from Mogadishu via Afgoye, Wanla Weyne and Buur Hakaba to Baidoa, establishing garrisons in each of these towns and in Baidoa itself.\textsuperscript{141} This does not explicitly imply that the whole road from Mogadishu to the
Ethiopian border is under control of the government, but at least the main towns are.

AMISOM and SNA forces replaced most of the Ethiopian troops in Baidoa. The surrounding territory was secured to the West and Southwest, even up to Qansax Dheere and Goof Gadauud. In addition, a police force was re-established in the town as 122 UNDP-trained officers were detached from Mogadishu. Some 650 former police officers have possibly been added by now, after they have undergone a refresher-training course.

Baidoa itself was experiencing an improved security situation for the last few months, with a similar development as in e.g. Merka and Belet Weyne. Security incidents involving armed clashes and explosive devices are diminishing, while assassinations and attacks using hand grenades still take place – although the Security Analysis Unit reports in May 2013 that Baidoa was “exceptionally calm in the last two months.”

Security incidents in Baidoa 3/2012-4/2013

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2012</th>
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<td><strong>Assassinations and</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hand grenade attack</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Assassination</strong></td>
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 Territory of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) in Central Somalia
Concerning the area of ASWJ, information provided implies that the administration is functioning relatively well. The troops of ASWJ are securing the territory and cities; the judicial system mainly relies on “shariah courts”. However, ASWJ is not able to enlarge its area of control, due to internal fractures and lack of forces, although their
announcements are contradictory. After agreements already signed in 2012, early in 2013 rumors about a merger of ASWJ and Galmudug were again circulating. So far there is no result on that and in fact, this would be an unlikely surprising step.

AS is not really posing an imminent security threat to the ASWJ-territory. First of all, the frontline is only defended by a mere 500-800 AS-fighters. Additionally, a former attack and invasion of Dhusamareb showed its inability to get even little sympathy from the population. AS evacuated the town only days after it had seized it. Finally, the presence of Ethiopian troops in Guri Ceel poses an additional obstacle for AS in the area.

Belet Weyne, being on the “outskirts” of the ASWJ administration, now has a mixed force of Djiboutian AMISOM and Ethiopian forces manning its inner and outer perimeter. The exact composition of local forces in the town is difficult to assess. Splinter groups of ASWJ as well as forces of the “Shabelle Valley State” prevail. Overall, the statistics below show that the security situation in the town has improved.

**Security Incidents in Belet Weyne 1/2012-4/2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assassinations and hand grenade attacks Belet Weyne</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<th>Clashes and explosive devices Belet Weyne</th>
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<td>Clash with AS</td>
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<td>Internal clash</td>
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<td>Explosive device</td>
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**Ximan & Xeeb**

To further strengthen his position, there are rumors of Galmudug’s Qeybdiid attempting to convince the local authority of Ximan & Xeeb to incorporate into Galmudug. It is unknown to which extend the leader of Ximan & Xeeb, Mohamed Adan Tiiceey, is responding to this bid. Although the plans were denied by Ximan &
Xeeb as recently as January 2013, Tiiceey’s administration, hardly governing more than the city of Cadaado, is running out of money. Therefore, a merger between the two territories is not to be ruled out. The election of Abdullahi Ali Mohamed as new president of the entity in June 2013 might change those plans.

Formed only in 2009, the entity’s administration is providing basic services like schools and water holes. Even a small police force exists, but the overall size of its militia does not exceed 400 members. To what extend the reported integration of “320 former pirates into its security forces” will have an effect, remains to be seen. The administration provides security on the main road that is crossing Ximan & Xeeb traversing from ASWJ territory to Galmudug. The road is kept clear from bandits and illegal roadblocks, but the administration itself collects toll. Besides Cadaado and the main road, the rest of the territory is left to the control of the traditional clan system. However, it is remarkable, that “despite the scourge of Al Shabaab terrorists and well-funded pirate gangs […], Himan and Heeb under Tiiceey have positively extended security inch by inch”.

Regarding AS, Ximan & Xeeb turns a blind eye on operatives and material crossing its territory, not being in a position to defend itself against the Islamists. On the other hand, there is no danger of an infiltration by AS, as Mohamed Adan’s authority is considerably backed by the local clan and the population.

Galmudug

The former warlord and ally of Farah Aideed, Abdi Hasan Awale ‘Qeybdiid’, took power in the self-governing region of Galmudug early in 2012. Since then, the president-turned-warlord took several measures to upgrade the area’s administration and security apparatus. The inclusion of additional security forces, their training and stipends are partly supported by UNDP. Their force numbers between 1,000-1,200 members, including local and clan militia. Police stations were and are newly opened at different locations in Galmudug and the government is able to provide a higher level of public order.

In addition, the administration provides public services, like schools, administration and judicial institutions. Still fluid is the situation in the coastal area of Galmudug, where the government’s influence is still limited – despite broadly publicized but rare incursions in the name of fighting piracy.
Another security hotspot is southern Galkacyo where clan disputes on a larger scale occurred within the last years. The government is busy calming the conflicts, with a new police station in town recently opening. Nevertheless, as the government of Puntland puts it, “the efforts to improve security in the region of Mudug - shared by both Puntland and Galmudug - have taken setbacks.”

AS is not a major issue in Galmudug. First and foremost, the geographical location between Ximan & Xeeb and Puntland precludes direct confrontations. Besides, large parts of the population are not open to recruitment or propaganda by AS. A security issue that could arise is the question of federalism and the way in which the government in Mogadishu is confronting Qeybdiid with reluctance.

Puntland

When President Farole announced the postponement of elections in 2012, Puntland was on the brink of escalation. The government successfully managed to reduce tensions by e.g. the legitimation of political parties, the creation of an electoral authority and the installation of a constitutional court.

While those frictions have been eased at least until now (tensions are growing again in front of the elections), it was another task to keep the AS-linked insurgency isolated in the Golis Mountains/Galgala. Attempts of the insurgents and AS earlier 2012 to gain a foothold in Bossaso and additional recruitment activities could be fought back. It is highly unlikely that AS will be able to step up its efforts in Puntland, because villagers themselves are attacking recruiters. Meanwhile, the Galgala militants – an estimated bunch of 300 – are not in a position to extend their area of influence. Occasionally they attack surrounding villages in an attempt to acquire supplies. Sometimes, they even reach the main road linking Bossaso with the capital Garoowe, being driven back by Puntland forces time and again.

One of the main reasons for neither the Galgala insurgency nor al Shabaab to be able to gain support in Puntland is the simple matter of fact, that any disturbance concerning the port of Bossaso and the road leading to the city is seen as a trouble for business and exports – and therefore the disruption of income for the mostly pastoralist inhabitants of the country.

Initially seen as a power to fight piracy, the foreign forces financed and PSC-trained 1,200-1,300 strong Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) is the only powerful and reliable group within the security forces. The unit is described as a “well-
equipped elite force [...] with air assets used to carry out ground attacks.”  

Until now, it was hardly ever utilized to fight piracy but is more than anything a force to fight any problem identified by president Farole, to whom the unit reports. Unfortunately, financial problems have arisen with PMPF-members being unpaid and pulled back to Bossaso. 

Beside imminent security problems, different security forces, including a well-trained intelligence agency, handle other security issues. The Puntland Police has more than 2,600 officers on the payroll. Administration and security forces are present in the main cities, especially in Bossaso and Garoowe as well as in North-Galkacyo. Security agents or court-militia intervene when needed. This is why even the usual criminality is on a low level. Outside the cities and especially in the countryside away from the main roads, Puntland is not able to provide security forces on a larger scale. State institutions and police are only present on a small scale with the latter often being provided via the traditional clan mechanisms. The smallest presence of state institutions is found along the coast, with parts of the Northeastern coast of the Bari region not even controlled by the government.

The Puntland government is not sympathetic to the Sool-Sanaag-Cayn militia (SSC). It is not intervening in behalf of the SSC or Khatumo nor is it fighting them – at least as long the conditions mentioned above (free traffic on the main roads) are satisfied.

The same sentiment applies to the Somaliland relations. There are no signs of any armed engagement towards Hargeysa. But for all the security issues on the western border of Puntland – be it Somaliland, the SSC or the Galgala militants – the fully guaranteed period of relative peaceful days is only given until after the presidential elections, scheduled for 2014. But even if the newly elected Puntland administration pushes on its efforts concerning oil exploration, it seems unlikely, that an armed conflict on a bigger scale would prop up in the calm northern corner of Somalia.

Somaliland

In sharp contrast to other parts of Somalia, the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland has no important security issues to worry about. According to the director of the Africa Research Institute in London, Edward Paice: “With occasional lapses, Somaliland has been successful at maintaining peace for more than two de-
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cades. The country created a credible constitution, held a nationwide referendum on independence, has conducted a succession of largely free elections and has effected peaceful transfers of power.”

Still, large parts of Somaliland’s small budget are allocated towards the armed forces. This army consists of roughly 35,000 civilian and military personnel. It only has out-dated equipment at its disposal. In contrast to other security forces in Somalia, Somaliland’s army is well organized, with brigades based in all the regions under control of the government – including an artillery brigade, a mechanized brigade and tank brigades.

The total number of police in Somaliland is unclear. According to Somalia Report, the total number – including custodial corps and traffic police – was estimated at roughly 50,000 across Somaliland. The policemen receive their training at the Mandera Academy, with some 800-900 graduates in 2012 alone. UNDP is supporting these training activities. There are some specialised units within the police force: the Special Protection Units (SPUs), responsible for the security of ‘internationals’; the Resistant Reaction Unit (RRU), responsible for emergency response (including diffusing of explosive devices); and special squads guarding the head of state and other high ranking officials.

Concerning the conflict with the Darod/Dulbahante, their Khatumo State and SSC-militia, the Somaliland government’s reaction until now was marked by a mixture of negotiations, inclusion, and armed confrontation. So far, the government was able to split the Dulbahante alliance, thereby further weakening the SSC. A source mentioned that the importance of this group is highly over-estimated: Firstly, it is unknown who is still supporting Khatumo and the SSC. Secondly, even given the fact that the central government in Mogadishu held talks with representatives of Khatumo, mere talks and discussions serve as the sole support system. Thirdly, the fighting force of the SSC is hampered by the fact that the majority of its members are pastoralists who are only available on a seasonal basis. Consequently, it is highly likely that the SSC poses nothing more than a locally very isolated threat to Somaliland.

Besides the SSC/Khatumo issue, there is no other conflict on the radar. In the areas controlled by the Somaliland security forces, comprised of an efficient army and the police, the government provides basic public security. This of course excludes the territory held by Khatumo/SSC. There is a presence of security forces in all districts.
and they provide assistance not only in criminal matters but also if and when clan conflicts tend to escalate. Usually, the government tries to negotiate and mediate between clans while showing force in a parallel move. Even the coast of Somaliland is secured and free of pirates, with a nucleus navy hunting down suspects regularly. The judicial system is functioning, several levels for appellation are provided.\textsuperscript{182}

Although the AS-leader Godane originates from Burco in Somaliland, the Islamist movement has no basis to operate or recruit within the country. Furthermore, there are cells of AS in Hargeysa and Burco, but those are primarily responsible to guarantee the transit of supplies and operatives.\textsuperscript{183}

**Findings**

Laetitia Bader, expert with Human Rights Watch, comments on security issues in Somalia: Security is not a question about the number of security forces; it is a question about their responsibility. As always in conflict torn countries it will be those who are able to provide basic services – including security – that will win hearts and minds of the population. If the government is not able to fill the vacuum in areas where al Shabaab was driven away, it will be only a question of time, until people will turn to either al Shabaab or other actors (militias, warlords etc.) as it had happened with previous governments.\textsuperscript{184}

There is a point in this assessment. There are some anti-AS-forces who do not provide training for their fighters; for example clan militias. However, as shown above, most of the other (expanding) forces receive training before being deployed.\textsuperscript{185} This training, mainly implemented by AMISOM, UNDP, and the EUTM, includes different facets, e.g. human rights. Therefore, by adding those new forces, the number of better-trained soldiers and police is increasing. Saying that, there is coherence between rising numbers of security forces and an increase in quality, be it the ability to maintain security or the way to approach civilians.

Thus, there is a visible disparity between the area of ‘Jubbaland’ – where many of the forces did not receive adequate training – and the government controlled areas in Lower and Middle Shabelle regions. This difference is even more apparent when Puntland and Somaliland are included in the conversation.
Stabilization assessment

**Definition of levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Stabilization</th>
<th>Full</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-AS-forces in place</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient security forces</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State control (or similar)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training available for new forces</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Command/Control structures</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police services population</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice system in place</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population trusts the security forces</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threat of (re-) capture by AS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threat of armed incursions by AS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly any armed confrontations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly any terrorist attacks</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal tensions are low</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threat of disintegration</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The security situation in the southern/central parts of Somalia controlled by AMISOM in tandem with the Somali government is improving daily. As long as the African Union keeps up its peace mission (rather enforcement than keeping) and as long as resources are provided to ensure improved training and equipment for the government’s security forces, a resurgence of al Shabaab or warlords in these parts of the country seems to be out of the question. Therefore, the overall status quo could be qualified as stabilized at a **medium level for the bigger cities with garrisons** (including Mogadishu), at a **lower level for the countryside**, where incursions by AS can occur.

Mogadishu itself might not be at peace, but it is definitely not at war. There are several risk groups that still have to fear the covered presence of AS within the city, but the common man in Mogadishu only has to fear the famous ‘wrong place, wrong time’ – as cited in almost all security reports. With the war outside the city’s doors, with militias and clans rapidly diminishing, terrorism and criminality are now the main threats. Those can hopefully be further contained by the continuing influx of newly trained security personal.

As for southern Somalia and ‘Jubbaland’, the situation can only be qualified as stabilized on a **lower level in the garrison-towns of AMISOM** (e.g., Kismayo, Afmadow) and in the areas of the Ogadeni clan controlled by Raskamboni. It is
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the quarrel about ‘Jubbaland’ that is of rising concern, posing a threat to Somalia, as the government in Mogadishu is trying hard to secure its grip on the different autonomously acting regions. Although AMISOM is still in control of the situation, the re-emergence of clanism and militias in this region is alarming.

The areas bordering Ethiopia are likely to stay under control of the Ethiopian army. There are no signs that Addis Ababa is willing to allow AS to – again – settle down along the border. Therefore, those areas are militarily secured against AS by Ethiopia and local militias, with local clans governing their territories. However, those areas have to be assessed as stabilized on a low level only.

The parts of Somalia still under control of AS are worst off. The more pressure is put on the Islamists, the more trigger-happy and brutal AS deals with the population. Consequently, these areas are to be marked as destabilized.

Concerning the area of ASWJ, Ximan&Xeeb, and Galmudug, the security situation could be assessed as stabilized on a medium level – with the exceptions of the ASWJ-AS-frontline (possible incursions) and the town of Galkacyo (clan feuds). This assessment only affects the areas under control of the named entities, and of course not e.g. the coastal pirate areas.

In regard to Puntland, its overall security level in areas under control can be assessed as being on a higher level of stabilization. Here, too, this only affects areas under control of the government. Exceptions are of course some parts of the coastal areas (pirates) and the Golis Mountain Range (Galgala militants).

The government of Puntland commands only a small security force. Until now, this force’s size was sufficiently, in order to cover general security needs in the core parts of the region. In order to reach out to the periphery or to deal with the Galgala militants, Puntland would have to take more measures to increase its capacity.

As for Somaliland, the self-declared republic commands sufficient security forces – be it army or police – to cover the needs of state control. The government in Har-geysa is able to not only provide basic security, but peaceful conditions in most of its territory. The exceptions here are the districts of Buuhoodle, Taalex and Xudun (SSC militia). The security situation in all other parts of Somaliland under control of the government can be assessed as fully stabilized.
## Areas of Control (AoC)

As to further clarify the picture in relation to the areas mentioned above, there is a need to provide data on the different AoC. Therefore, the following table is mirroring the situation as of May/June 2013. Sources are:

- Department (several dates): weekly security reports until July 2013.

The division of regions and districts used is the official version of 1990. Other divisions or names, as e.g. used by Somaliland are not included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Full control</th>
<th>Shared/Disputed</th>
<th>Annotations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Juba (Hoose)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 | Badhaadhe | Raskamboni + AMISOM (Kenya)  
- Badhaadhe  
- Ras Kambooni  
  Raskamboni  
- Kulbiyow  
- Buur Gaabo | Al Shabaab + Raskamboni  
  • Countryside |  |
| 2 | Kismayo | Raskamboni + AMISOM (Kenya)  
  + Isiolo  
- Kismayo town  
- Kismayo town outer perimeter | Al Shabaab + Raskamboni  
  • Countryside  
  • Main Road (Kismayo-Afmadow) |  
- Control over Kismayo town challenged by various Clan militia (Barre Hiraale; Galje’cel etc.)  
- Incursions and ambushes by AS along main road |
| 3 | Afmadow | Raskamboni + AMISOM (Kenya)  
  + Isiolo  
- Afmadow town  
- Dhobley  
  Raskamboni + AMISOM (Kenya)  
- Diif  
  Al Shabaab  
- Countryside North of the line Diif-Afmadow and East of the Kismayo-Afmadow road | Al Shabaab + Raskamboni + Isiolo + AMISOM (Kenya)  
  • Main road from Kenya to Kismayo  
  • Countryside South of line Diif-Afmadow and West of the Kismayo-Afmadow road |  |
| 4 | Jamaame | Al Shabaab | |  |
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Full control</th>
<th>Shared/Disputed</th>
<th>Annotations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Juba (Dhexe)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Jilib</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Signs of movement of anti-AS forces towards Jilib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Buale</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sakow</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gedo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Baardheere</td>
<td>Isiolo + AMISOM (Kenya) [+ units of the SNA]</td>
<td>Isiolo + AMISOM (Kenya) + al Shabaab [+ units of the SNA]</td>
<td>• Possible garrison of AMISOM (Kenya) on the banks of the Juba river vis-à-vis Baardheere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Faafax Dhuun</td>
<td>• Western third of the district (border area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>• Main road leading from Faafax Dhuun to the Juba river</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eastern two thirds of the district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Baardheere town</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Ceel Waaq</td>
<td>Isiolo + AMISOM (Kenya) [+ units of the SNA]</td>
<td>Isiolo + AMISOM (Kenya) + al Shabaab [+ units of the SNA]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ceel Waaq town</td>
<td>• Western half of the district</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eastern half of the district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Bulo Xawo</td>
<td>AMISOM (Kenya) + local clan militia</td>
<td>AMISOM (Kenya) + al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bulo Xawo</td>
<td>• Southern quarter of the district</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>• ASWJ (South) + AMISOM (Kenya) + Ethiopia + units of the SNA + local clan militia + al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gaddoon Dhowe</td>
<td>• Northern quarter of the district</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Central part of the district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Garbahaarey</td>
<td>ASWJ (South) + Ethiopia + units of the SNA</td>
<td>ASWJ + Ethiopia + al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Garbahaarey town</td>
<td>• Countryside North of Garbahaarey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>• Main Road towards Luuq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Buurduubo</td>
<td>• Main Road towards Buulo Xawo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All of the countryside East and South of Garbahaarey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Full control</th>
<th>Shared/Disputed</th>
<th>Annotations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gedo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Doolow</td>
<td>Ethiopia + units of the SNA • Doolow town • Ethiopia + units of the SNA</td>
<td>Ethiopia + units of the SNA + local clan militia + al Shabaab • countryside</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Luuq</td>
<td>• Luuq town • Ethiopia + SNA • Main road from Luuq towards Baidoa • Al Shabaab • Eastern quarter of the district</td>
<td>ASWJ + units of the SNA + Ethiopia + al Shabaab • Countryside Southwest of Luuq Units of the SNA + Ethiopia + local clan militia + al Shabaab • Countryside West, North and East of Luuq</td>
<td>• Possible Incursions by al Shabaab along the main road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bay</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Qansax Dheere</td>
<td>Ethiopia + SNA • Qansax Dheere town • Al Shabaab • Remaining parts of the district</td>
<td>Ethiopia + SNA + al Shabaab • Road linking Qansax Dheere to the main Baidoa-Luuq road</td>
<td>• Likely future replacement of Ethiopian troops AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Diinsoor</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Buur Hakaba</td>
<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA • Buur Hakaba town • Main road Baidoa-Mogadishu • Al Shabaab • Remaining parts of the district</td>
<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA + Ethiopia • Baidoa town • Baidoa outer perimeter • Berdaale • Main road Baidoa-Luuq and Baidoa-Mogadishu • Al Shabaab • Remaining parts of the district</td>
<td>• Possible Incursions by al Shabaab along the main road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Baidoa</td>
<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA + Ethiopia • Baidoa town • Baidoa outer perimeter • Berdaale • Main road Baidoa-Luuq and Baidoa-Mogadishu • Al Shabaab • Remaining parts of the district</td>
<td>Ethiopia + SNA + al Shabaab • Road linking Qansax Dheere to the main Baidoa-Luuq road</td>
<td>• Possible Incursions by al Shabaab along the main road • Possible re-emergence of local clan militia (e.g. Rahanweyn Resistance Army) • Likely future replacement of Ethiopian troops by AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) in Berdaale and Baidoa town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Full control</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bakool</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Waajid</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Rab Dhuure</td>
<td>Units of the SNA + Ethiopia + local clan militia</td>
<td>local clan militia + al Shabaab + Ethiopia [+ units of the SNA]</td>
<td>Border area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Yeed Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Southern three quarters of the district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Ceel Barde</td>
<td>Ethiopia + local clan militia + units of the SNA</td>
<td>local clan militia + al Shabaab + Ethiopia [+ units of the SNA]</td>
<td>Border area East of Ceel Barde town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ceel Barde town</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Border area West of Ceel Barde town</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Southern half of the district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Xudur</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Tijeglow</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Shabelle (Hoose)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Sablaale</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Baraawe</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Kurtunwaarey</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Marka</td>
<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA</td>
<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA + al Shabaab</td>
<td>Possible internal AS-clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Marka town</td>
<td>• Southern half of the district but the main road</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Northern half of the District bordering Benadir</td>
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<td>• Main Road linking Marka to Mogadishu</td>
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<td>27 Qoriyooleey</td>
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<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA + al Shabaab</td>
<td>Possible Incursions by al Shabaab along the main road</td>
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<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA</td>
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<td>• Areas South of the Shabelle river to the level of Marka</td>
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### The Security Situation in Somalia

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<td>• All parts South of the Shabelle river</td>
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<td>• Road linking Baidoa to Mogadishu</td>
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<td>• Countryside North of the Shabelle river beside the main road</td>
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<td>• Road linking Baidoa to Mogadishu</td>
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<td>Al Shabaab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Mahadaay</td>
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<td>• Northern half of the district and countryside in the Southwest</td>
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<td>31 Balcad</td>
<td>AMISOM (Uganda, Burundi) + SNA + al Shabaab</td>
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<td>• Warsheikh</td>
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<td>• Main road connecting Mogadishu and Jowhar</td>
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<td>• Countryside East of Balcad and North of Warsheikh</td>
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<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>• Possible internal AS-clashes</td>
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<td>Bulo Burte</td>
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<td>Belet Weyne</td>
<td>Units of the SNA + local clan militia + ASWJ + Ethiopia + AMI-SOM (Djibouti)</td>
<td>• Belet Weyne town</td>
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<td>• East bank of the Shabelle river</td>
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<td>Units of the SNA + local clan militia + ASWJ</td>
<td>• Main road from Belet Weyne up to the Southen district border</td>
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<td>• North-eastern edge of the district</td>
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<td>• Matabaan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Main road linking Belet Weyne and Galkacyo</td>
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<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>• South-western edge of the district including Ceel Cali</td>
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<td>Units of the SNA + local clan militia + ASWJ + al Shabaab</td>
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<td>Local clan militias + al Shabaab</td>
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<td>• North-western quarter of the district</td>
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<td>• Border area west of the Shabelle river</td>
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<td>• South-eastern quarter of the district</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local clan militia + ASWJ + al Shabaab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Area between Belet Weyne, main road to Galkacyo and the regional border to Galguduud</td>
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<td><strong>Galguduud</strong></td>
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<td>Ceel Dhere</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
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<td>Ceel Buur</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
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<td>Dhusamareb</td>
<td>ASWJ + Ethiopia</td>
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<td>• Guri Ceel</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASWJ</td>
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<td>• Dhusamareb town</td>
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<td>• Western half of the district</td>
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<td>Ximan &amp; Xeeb</td>
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<td>• Eastern half of the district</td>
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<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>• Southern strip of the district</td>
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# The Security Situation in Somalia

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<tr>
<th>District</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Galguduud</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 40 Caabudwaaq | ASWJ  
• Cabud Waaq town  
• Balambale  
• All territory except the North-eastern edge  
Ximan&Xeeb  
• North-eastern edge | | |
| 41 Cadaado | Ximan&Xeeb  
• Cadaado town  
• Main road up to Galinsoor  
• Baxdo  
• All of the remaining countryside but the North-eastern quarter  
Galmudug  
• North-eastern quarter of the district | | | |

**Mudug**

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<tr>
<td>42 Xaradheeere</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pirates controlling part of the coast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 43 Hobyo | Galmudug  
• All but small areas on the district’s borders and the coast  
Ximan&Xeeb  
• South-western edge of the district  
Al Shabaab  
• Southern strip of the district  
Puntland  
• Northern strip of the district  
Pirates  
• Few coastal areas including Ceel Dhahanaan and Qallad | Galmudug + Pirates  
• Hobyo | • Pirates controlling part of the coast |
| 44 Galkacyo | Galmudug  
• South Galkacyo  
• Southern half of the district  
Puntland  
• North Galkacyo  
• Northern half of the district | | |
### Districts in Somalia

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<td>45 Galdogob</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<tr>
<td>46 Jariiban</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pirates controlling part of the coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All but small areas on the coast Pirates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few coastal areas including Garacad</td>
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<td><strong>Nugaal</strong></td>
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<td>47 Burintle</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<td>48 Eyl</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<tr>
<td>49 Garoowe</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<td><strong>Bari</strong></td>
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<td>50 Qardho</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td></td>
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<td>51 Bandar Beyla</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>• All but small areas on the coast Pirates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few coastal areas including Fundhuc Dule</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Pirates controlling part of the coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 Iskushuban</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>Puntland + local clan militia</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Southern two thirds of the district Local clan militia</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Baargaal Pirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Few coastal areas including Gumbax</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Northern third of the district Puntland + Galgala insurgents</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Central part of the district next to Golis Mountains</td>
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<td><strong>Puntland + Galgala insurgents</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Galgala militants</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Golis Mountain Range</strong></td>
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<td>53 Bossaso</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<td>• Bossaso town outer perimeter</td>
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<td>• Northern, Eastern and Southern part of the district Galgala militants</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Golis Mountain Range</td>
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<td>54 Qandala</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 Caluula</td>
<td>Puntland • Caluula town Pirates • Few coastal areas</td>
<td>Puntland + local clan militia • All of the remaining district</td>
<td>• Pirates controlling part of the coast</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sool</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>56 Taalex</td>
<td>Puntland • Eastern strip of the district</td>
<td>Local clan militia + SSC/Khatumo • Taalex town Puntland + Somaliland + SSC/Khatumo + local clan militia • All remaining parts of the district</td>
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<tr>
<td>57 Laascaanood</td>
<td>Somaliland • Laascaanood town • Laascaanood outer perimeter • Main road linking Burco and Garoowe Puntland • Eastern strip of the district</td>
<td>Somaliland + SSC/Khatumo • Countryside in the western half of the district Puntland + SSC/Khatumo • Most of the countryside in the eastern part of the district</td>
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<td>58 Xudun</td>
<td>Somaliland • Xudun town • Western half of the district</td>
<td>SSC/Khatumo + Somaliland • Eastern half of the district</td>
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<td>59 Caynabo</td>
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<td>60 Laasqoray</td>
<td>Local clan • Laasqoray town Galgala militants • Golis Mountain Range Puntland • Badhan • Dhahar</td>
<td>Local clan + Puntland • Most of the countryside Galgala Militants + Puntland • Area between Golis Mountains and coast</td>
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<td>Puntland + Local clan</td>
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<td>Buuhoodle</td>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>SSC + Somaliland</td>
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<td>• Buuhoodle town</td>
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<td>Sheikh</td>
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<td><strong>Woqooyi Galbeed/Marodi Jeeh</strong></td>
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<td>Saylac</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Andreas Tiwald is a Country of Origin Information expert on Somalia and other African countries in the Austrian Federal Asylum Office.
Sources used


The Security Situation in Somalia


The Security Situation in Somalia


Restricted Sources

- Security Analysis Expert, Austria (22 May 2013): Interview
- Security Analysis Expert, Austria (10 June 2013): Telephone Interview
- Security Analysis Expert, Austria (13 June 2013): Email

This Expert has been working on Somalia for several years and possesses profound knowledge about the security situation in the Horn of Africa. The Expert visits the region on a regular basis.

- Security Analysis Unit, working for NGOs active in Somalia (8 May 2013): Security Report

This unit provides security monitoring and analysis for INGOs and NGOs working in Somalia. The unit has several sources within Somalia at its command. It is providing its services since several years. Due to the fact that the unit’s own products are restricted (as to safeguard their own sources’ security) it was refrained to exclude the unit’s name as a source.

- Department (several dates): Weekly security reports until July 2013

One of the tasks of this department is the monitoring and analysis of the security situation in Somalia with a special focus on the security of its own staff.

Annex 1: Abbreviations and Glossary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amniyat</td>
<td>Al Shabaab’s special operations and intelligence branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Al Shabaab (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td>Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo/Azania</td>
<td>Militia in ‘Jubbaland’ (now mostly JDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDF</td>
<td>Juba Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMPF</td>
<td>Puntland Maritime Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Private Security Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raskamboni</td>
<td>Militia in ‘Jubbaland’ (mainly Darod/Ogadeni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahanweyn Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Sool-Sanaag-Cayn Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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1 Ethiopia is the key player in the region, trying to secure its own hinterland. In addition, Addis Ababa is a close ally of the secessionist Republic of Somaliland.

2 It should be remarked, that this article focuses on security issues caused by mankind, not by nature.


9 Security Analysis Expert, Austria (22 May 2013): Interview; an international Agency cited by Landinfo states, that a lack of funding and the motivation to put pressure on AMISOM to take over Ethiopian positions could have led to the withdrawal from Xudur. See: Landinfo (May 2013), p42

10 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)

11 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); this was not an “unexpected” withdrawal, as circulated by different security analysts, e.g. by the ISS. See: Institute for Security Studies (ISS; 9 April 2013): Tensions over the Jubaland process in Somalia could embolden Al-Shabaab, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/tensions-over-the-jubaland-process-in-somalia-could-embolden-al-shabaab, accessed 1 June 2013

12 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); according to UNHCR, the trek moving northwards to the town of Ceel Barde comprised 2,500 persons. See: UNHCR (8 April 2013): Xudur Displacement, https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1366199334_xudurflashreport.pdf, accessed 31 May 2013

13 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)


15 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); compare: an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p41; but of course, government officials talk of upcoming confrontations and there are scaled up activities in Bay and Bakool regions. See for example: Shabelle Media Network (29 May 2013): Government Officials in Bai and Bakol Regions - We Are in Final Stages to Wipe Out Alshabab, http://shabelle.net/government-officials-in-bai-and-bakol-regions-we-are-in-final-stages-to-wipe-out-alshabab/, accessed 4 June 2013

16 not to forget about logistical challenges (longer supply lines, signals, poor infrastructure)

17 UNDSS e.g. names Jowhar and Merka. See: UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p40

18 Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre states that the people know, that “it is AMISOM who is ‘driving the car.’” See: DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p8

19 An international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p7

20 Security Analysis Unit, working for NGOs active in Somalia (8 May 2013): Security Report

21 UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p42

22 Sector 2, Kismayo and ‘Jubbaland’, i.e. Middle and Lower Jubba regions and Gedo: Kenyan and Sierra Leonean forces; see: AMISOM (2013)

23 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
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24 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
25 Security Analysis Expert, Austria (10 June 2013): Telephone interview
26 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
28 Security Analysis Expert (10 June 2013)
29 Security Analysis Expert (10 June 2013)
30 Hassan M. Abukar/African Arguments (2 July 2013): The Godane Coup and the Unraveling of Al-Shabaab, http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/02/somalia-the-godane-coup-and-the-unraveling-of-al-shabaab-%e2%80%93-by-hassan-m-abukar/, accessed 12 July 2013; one of the two murdered AS-members was the co-founder of AS, Ibrahim al-Afghani. At the same time, high-ranking member Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys handed himself over to the Somali authorities and the leading figure of Mukhtar Robow was „thrown out” of AS.
31 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); compare: IHS Jane’s (10 April 2013), p6
32 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); according to this source, the wage for a fighter is now about 200 US-Dollar per month – quite a lot of money under the conditions given in Somalia. This cut in wages has not led to a rising number of defections.
33 Hassan M. Abukar/African Arguments (2 July 2013)
34 a town situated close to Baidoa on the main road leading to Luuq
35 An analysis of IHS Jane’s was read: “[AS’s] capabilities have been severely degraded and its strategic options significantly restricted”. See: IHS Jane’s (10 April 2013), p1
36 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
37 IHS Jane’s (10 April 2013), p6; it can be presumed, that IHS Jane’s did not classify the Somaliland Army as “native actor” in Somalia. The Somaliland army is definitely more powerful than AS.
38 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
39 IHS Jane’s (10 April 2013), p4
40 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013); for example, Peter Klansoe (Danish Refugee Council) numbers child violations committed by AS for March 2013 alone with 230. See: Peter Klansoe in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p38
42 Former president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed considered the creation of ‘Jubbaland’ already back in 2009. The plan was followed by steps of the minister of defense, Mohamed Abdi Gandi, who managed to get the facilitation of the training of 2,000 troops by the Kenyan army. IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p1; most of the Marehan-part of those 2,000 troops are now included in the Isiolo/Juba Defence Force.
43 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p3
44 DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p39
45 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
46 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p3
48 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); the Somali government’s reactions on Hiraale’s announcement were negative, but this was qualified as smoke launcher action by the Security Analysis Expert. The Security Analysis Unit notes, that the Somali government was facilitating the return of Hiraale to Kismayo. Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
49 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
50 The JDF is somehow the former Marehan-part of the Azania/Isiolo troops trained in Kenya. They are linked via the Kenyan Army to Raskamboni. Recently, the whole of the forces under Ahmed Madobe seems to have been renamed in ‘Jubbaland Defense Forces’ – including Raskamboni troops.
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51 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)


55 The focus on Kismayo was additionally driven by the ‘Jubbaland’ conference taking place in the city. AS conducted mortar attacks on the airport, direct military attacks and an attack involving an explosive device. Additionally, it was reported that AS granted permission to some 200 Marehan militia from Gedo to transit its territory towards Kismayo. Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013); UNDSS states: Even a number of 450 Marehan militias could have been transiting to Kismayo, hosted by AS and likely instructed by the SNG to go to Kismayo in attempt to disrupt the ‘Jubbaland’ Conference. UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p39

56 UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p39


58 Until now, there was an emphasis on attacks involving hand grenades and assassinations, the more an area was under control by anti-AS elements. The weaker the latter’s basis, the more likely were incidents of armed clashes.

59 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013); data for May 2013 only cover the first week; assassinations include extrajudicial killings.


61 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p3


63 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)


66 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); in the 90s, Qeybdiid was an ally of Mohamed Aideed whose son is to be said to be the man of the Somali government to replace Qeybdiid. See: Garowe Online (5 April 2013): Somalia Govt Pursuing Leadership Change in Galmudug – Sources, http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_govt_pursuing_leadership_change_in_Galmudug_sources.shtml, accessed 4 June 2013

67 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)

68 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p3

69 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)

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71 IHS Jane's (7 May 2013), p5
72 IHS Jane's (7 May 2013), p3
73 constitution while we are implementing it.”
74 Weinstein, Michael/ Garowe Online (22 February 2013)
75 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
76 several sources in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p18-19
77 several sources in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013): p6 (INGO), p48 (UNHCR), p19 (INGO), p19 (UN Agency), p20 (UNDSS); Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
79 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
81 several sources in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p19
82 District Commissioner – in some districts a synonym for warlord
83 an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p19; the INGO ads, that the DC of Medina is enjoying “some respect for his administration and a relative security” in his district.
84 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); the incorporation of militia and militiamen is leading sources of DIS/Landinfo to state, that there are no clan-militias anymore in Mogadishu and that “clan affiliation is no longer a concern” in town. See: several sources in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p31-33
85 Elman Peace and Human Rights Center in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p34
86 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
87 an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p15-16
88 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
89 an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p44
90 ARTE GEIE/ Thomas Dandois/ Alexandra Kogan (2012)
91 The Amniyat is the special operations and intelligence branch of AS and is closely tied to AS-leader Godane.
92 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); IHS Jane’s (10 April 2013), p6; an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p7
93 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); this is an alarming development given the fact, that agent controllers are definitely operating covered. It shows that there might be hardly any secrets the security forces are able to hide vis-à-vis al Shabaab.
94 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
95 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
96 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); two sources in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013): p36 (UN agency), p13 (UNDSS)
97 For example, between 24 April and 8 May 2013 there were 13 hand grenade attacks registered, with 12 targeting security forces an 1 targeting an official. Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013); several sources of DIS/Landinfo state that the main targets of attacks by AS are security forces, AMISOM and persons affiliated to the government. See: several sources in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p10-12
98 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); e.g. the complex attack on the high court in Mogadishu on 14 April 2013, “involving armed gunmen, person-borne IEDs (i.e., suicide bombers), and a suicide vehicle-borne IED.” UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p23
99 UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p12
100 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
101 IHS Jane’s (10 April 2013), p6; Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
102 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
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103 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
104 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
106 UN Security Council (31 January 2013), p6
108 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
109 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
110 an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p22
113 an international NGO in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p21; a “1,000-strong special counter-terrorism unit formed by the Ministry of Defence and drawn from various branches of the armed forces and security services” is also named by Sabahi. See: Sabahi (2 May 2013); it is unknown, if this new unit incorporates the existing ‘Alpha group’, that is said to be part of the SNA. See: Somalia Report (14 June 2012)
114 A source mentioned that both units are already used in security operations in Mogadishu and therefore it is believed that they are at least partly operational. Security Analysis Expert, Austria (13. June 2013): Email
115 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
116 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
117 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
118 an international agency in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p35
119 an international agency in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p35; the wage of a soldier is given with 100 US-Dollar/month. Compare: IRIN (13 May 2013); IRIN puts the number of soldiers receiving those stipends at 13,000.
120 IRIN (13 May 2013)
121 an international agency in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p35
122 IRIN (13 May 2013)
123 Matt Bryden in IRIN (13 May 2013)
124 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
125 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p4
127 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
128 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
129 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p3
130 IHS Jane’s (7 May 2013), p3
131 The data for April 2013 is not fully incorporated; all statistical data bellow is sourced with: Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
133 This unit provides security monitoring and analysis for INGOs and NGOs working in Somalia. It is providing its services since several years. Due to the fact, that the unit’s own products are restricted (as to safeguard their own sources’ security) it was refrained to exclude the units name as a source.
134 UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p19-20; ‘medium risk’ applies for areas controlled and protected by AMI-SOM.
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135 UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p13
136 Data of: Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013); the data for April 2013 is not fully incorporated.
137 UN OCHA (10 May 2013)
138 Compare: Comment of UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p40
139 Compare: Comment of UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p40
140 Security Analysis Expert (10 June 2013)
141 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
142 UNDSS in DIS/Landinfo (May 2013), p50; an example of a recent attack along the road took place on 31 May 2013, when AS attacked AMISOM and SNA, who were rehabilitating the road close to Wanla Weyne. See: Sabahi (2 June 2013): Al-Shabaab attacks allied forces repairing roads in Lower Shabelle, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2013/06/02/newsbrief-03, accessed 3 June 2013
143 with AMISOM forces and tanks positioned; Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
144 UN Security Council (31 January 2013), p5
145 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
146 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
147 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013); on 26 April the ASWJ governor for Galgaduud Region announced the intensification for an offensive against Ceel Buur and Ceel Dheer districts.
149 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
150 Security Analysis Unit (8 May 2013)
151 Garowe Online (7 January 2013)
152 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
155 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
157 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); compare: Mareeg/Omar Hashi (27 February 2013)
158 UN Security Council (31 January 2013), p6
159 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
160 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
161 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
163 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
164 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
165 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); of course there are AS activities in Puntland, but on a very low scale and closely monitored by the security forces. For an example see: Garowe Online (4 June 2013): Puntland forces capture Al Shabaab agent after gunfight, http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Puntland_forces_capture_Alf_Shabaab_agent_after_gunfight.shtml, accessed 5 June 2013
166 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
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167 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
169 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); Monitoring Group on Somalia (27 June 2012), Point 63
170 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
172 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
173 When SSC militia blocked the road between Laascaanood (Somaliland) and Garoowe, the Puntland forces were quick to react and push them away. Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
174 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
177 Somalia Report (31 May 2012)
178 Somalia Report (31 May 2012)
179 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
181 parts of the district of Buuhoodle and north of Laascaanood up to Taleex
182 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013)
183 Security Analysis Expert (22 May 2013); see also: Somaliland Times/ Phillip van Gaalen-Prentice (17 May 2013)
185 the Somali police; the PMPF; the Somaliland police; the Puntland police; the Galmudug police; the SNA; and of course AMISOM
186 e.g. the governments of ASWJ, Ximan&Xeeb etc. as well as – unnamed – locally established clan administrations
Minorities in Somalia

Markus Höhne

Introduction

For most of the 20th century, Somalis were represented (and mostly represented themselves) as a homogenous ethnic group, with a common myth of origin (descent in the father’s line from a common ancestor), language (Somali), religion (Sunni Islam) and customs (mainly circulating around pastoral nomadism, particularly around camel husbandry). The social organization in clan-families, clans, sub-clans, and so forth, in seemingly perennial opposition to each other, still is perceived by many as the most distinctive feature of Somalis. The six large clan-families are Dir, Darood, Isaaq (often subsumed under Dir, but de facto an independent group), Hawiye, and Digil and Merifle (usually subsumed under the collective term Raxanweyn). They are divided into dozens of clans, hundreds of sub-clans and primary lineages, and thousands of diya-paying groups (diya-paying groups pay and receive compensation for damages, e.g. injuries sustained or caused by one of its members, collectively). Dir, Darood and Isaaq predominantly reside in the north, whereas Hawiye, Digil and Raxanweyn inhabit the center and the south of the Somali peninsula.

This representation arguably goes back to the influential accounts of the (northern) Somali society by Richard Burton and Ioan Myrdal Lewis. The latter presented the Somali society as ‘classical’ segmentary lineage society. In this perspective, Somalis (mostly pastoral nomads) display a strong sense of equality. Depending on the context, they act as members of distinct groups on different levels of segmentation. By partilineal descent all of them are connected through a ‘total genealogy’.

While particularly Lewis’ older accounts in ‘Peoples of the Horn’ and ‘A Pastoral Democracy’ were much more nuanced, what had emerged in later years was a ‘clan paradigm’ under which any social, political or economic dynamics were analyzed as related to patrilineal descent as main explanatory variable. The pastoral-nomadic Somali, exhibiting an egalitarian ethos and taking pride in being warriors, had also become accepted as the ‘typical’ Somali. This representation of the Somali was from the 1980s onward attacked as ‘static’ and ‘primordial’. More recent accounts emphasized economic and social inequalities and hierarchies and questioned the ethnic homogeneity and myth of origin of ‘the Somali’.
Without denying the role of the clan, which is still a relevant category among Somalis, this chapter seeks to diversify the perspective on Somali society by focusing on so-called minority groups. It uses secondary sources, some insights gained during field research in northern Somalia between 2002 and 2013 and information collected during telephone interviews with Somali asylum seekers in the UK as an expert writing reports for British authorities to outline the most salient features of these groups and locate them adequately in Somali history and politics, including their current situations in times of war. This article first outlines the various groups. One can distinguish ‘ethnic minorities’, ‘occupational groups’ and ‘religious minorities’. It then describes the situation of these groups in the 20th century, before it analyzes the impact of the civil war on them. A key development here is that the fighting in Somalia from 1991 onward had an ‘identity formation effect’. Some minority groups began to understand themselves as distinct groups, and were understood by, e.g. international humanitarian organizations, as such only in the face of systematic persecution by other Somali groups, which then were understood as ‘majority groups’. Also under international law, including regulations in place in the USA and the European Union, an individual becomes eligible for asylum when he/she can exhibit a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. This again had an effect on the identity of minority groups. The third section of this chapter deals with minority groups in Somaliland and Puntland in northern Somalia, where their persecution during the civil war was much less intensive, but where structural marginalization and ‘segregation’ of communities prevail. The text concludes by outlining recent dynamics regarding the partial empowerment of minority groups in contemporary Somali politics, which is, however, outweighed by the continued predicament of members of these groups in Somali society.

**Occupational Differentiation, Adoption and Social Stratification**

Virginia Luling concluded an article on ‘The other Somali’, published in 1984, with stressing that ‘Current published material on them [minority groups] is extremely meager; they have hardly ever been studied directly or enabled to give their own account of themselves.’ In fact, only a few older studies had taken up the subject, and apart from the article by Kirk in 1904, which is not cited by Luling, they did so only ‘by the way’. Kirk wrote on ‘outcast’ groups in northern Somalia. He mentioned the basic distinction between gob (gentry) and sab (lowborn; outcast). The Sab were
divided in Tumaal, Midgaan and Yibir. These groups were ‘scattered people of no fixed home, who often attach themselves in small groups or families [….] as servants, to the various Somali tribes all over the country.’ Kirk reported that these groups were not recognized as Somali by other Somalis, and that Somalis would not eat or intermarry with them. They formed endogamous groups attached to others as clients. Still, regarding language, physical features and culture, Somalis ‘proper’ and the outcasts in northern Somalia were quite similar. The Midgaan and Yibir spoke their own dialect, beside ‘standard’ northern Somali.

The Midgaan mostly worked as hunters, shoemakers, tanners, well diggers and water carriers for their hosts. They used to hunt with dogs and were considered unclean by many Somalis. The poison they used for their arrows was feared because of its lethal power. They also performed the operations of circumcision and infibulation. The Tumaal were traditionally blacksmiths and carpenters. The old sources do not provide more details on them. The Yibir, finally, were known as tanners, ‘sorcerers’ and ‘witches’. According to Kirk, ‘the chief income of the Yibirs is that derived from a toll called “samanyo” […] which consists usually of about two or three rupees, and is levied upon Somalis on the occasion of a birth of a child or a marriage.’ In exchange, the Yibir would give a charm to the newly born child or the couple. They would curse those refusing to pay. The legend behind this tradition concerned Maxamed Hanif, who is also known by the name Bu’ur Ba’ayr. He was a powerful spiritual leader and ancestor of the Yibir. He was opposed by a Muslim scholar among the Isaaq (Lewis, in a later account, mentioned that this scholar was called Sharif Yusuf Aw barkhadle). Sheikh Aw Barkhadle challenged Maxamed Hanif, and to proof his magic power, the Yibir leader passed through a mountain. Aw Barkhadle asked Allah to lock the magician inside the mountain, where Maxamed Hanif died. The samanyo would be legitimized as ‘blood compensation’ (diya) for the Yibir leader Maxamed Hanif, a fraction of which was to be paid every time a ‘Somali’ boy (and only a boy) was born or a marriage was conducted. The Yibir claimed, according to Kirk, origin from the Dushan of Arabia. The legend of Maxamed Hanif provided the basis for the hypothesis that the Yibir resided in northern Somalia before the Somali ‘proper’ arrived and were then conquered and subjugated by the latter. Some Yibir and other Somalis even argued that Yibir were actually related to the Hebrews of the Middle East. Kirk mentioned that demographically, the Midgaan were considered to be the most numerous group, while the Yibir were the least populous group. The Midgaan were sub-divided in Muse Dериye and Madiban.
small occupational group that mainly inhabits north-eastern and southern Somalia is called Yahar. They claim origin from Yemen.\footnote{16}

In his study of the written sources (in English, French, Italian and German) on the Somali, published in 1955, Lewis confirmed Kirk’s account and added that in southern Somalia, particularly among the Digil and Merifle, the outcasts were known as boon.\footnote{17} In the south, Sab was considered to be the ancestor of those groups commonly referred to as Raxanweyn, who distinguish themselves from the outcasts (hence, sab carried a different connotation in the south and in the north). In general, the outcast or occupational groups ‘have no recognized genealogy of their own’ and their rights (e.g., in case of homicide) and political representation were mediated through their patrons (who belonged to majority clan groups).\footnote{18}

Besides Midgaan, Tumaal and Yibir, Lewis mentioned several groups that were specialized in religious services. He argued that ‘in clan genealogies, religious groups frequently appear as lineages incorporated into the clan structure of the tribe. Names like Sheikhal [Sheekhaal], Asharaf, Faki, Fogi, etc., words denoting religious men or priests, indicate priestly sections when they occur in tribal genealogies.’\footnote{19} In Lewis’ view, these groups denoted ‘extraneous aggregates’ which originally were dependents of majority groups ‘into which they were admitted as clients (arifa, shegat [sheegat]) through the grant of land made to them.’\footnote{20} Intermarriage between them and their patrons was permitted and even esteemed, since the members of the religious groups were considered especially ‘blessed’. The concept of sheegat, which was mentioned by Lewis, can be translated as ‘adoption’. It comes from the Somali verb sheegasho, for ‘claiming’, ‘recounting one’s ancestry’, and refers to the act of claiming other people’s ancestors as one’s own, and thereby integrating (and being integrated) in this other group.

Much of the work in Somali studies in the 20th century concentrated on politics, history and culture of the so-called majority groups. Among the professional anthropologists, Virginia Luling was the first to advance the more systematic study of the marginal groups. She stressed that despite the well-known egalitarian character of Somali society, ‘some of its members were much less equal than the rest.’\footnote{21} She divided Somali minorities, whom she called ‘the other Somali’, into two broad groups: the occupational castes, which lived as clients among the majority groups (the ‘noble’ Somali) throughout Somalia, and the farming villagers of the inter-riverine area in southern Somalia. Regarding the occupational castes, Luling summarized the older sources (except Kirk; but the information she collected on
occupational groups was similar to what Kirk had provided before). She added that in southern Somalia, ‘occupational caste groups were scattered through the clan system, as weavers and potters as well as smiths, hunters and tanners, each small group having its own name. The words “Midgaan” and “Yibir” appear not to be known, and tumaal (from Somali “tum”, meaning “to beat”, “to hammer”) is generally simply the name of an occupation, not of a descent group.”22 Frequently, these three groups were subsumed in the south under the term Gacan Walaal (in Somali, gacan means ‘hand’; walaal stands for ‘siblings’; the term probably denotes groups known as manual workers, like shoemakers, smiths, tanners). There were also other occupational groups in the south, such as the Booni hunters. Besides these groups, Luling mentioned the farming villagers ‘who once lived under the nominal patronage of the pastoral clans and in alliance with them, but [now exist] essentially as independent communities.’23 The Dube and Shabelle villagers and farmers lived along the Shabelle River. The Eyle resided around Baydhabo in the inter-riverine area. The Tunni Torre were found around Barawa at the coast. The Gosha and Gobawiin had settled down along the Jubba River. Luling argued that ‘All these people had in common their low status with respect to the main Somali population, and their exclusion from intermarriage with them.’24

Regarding the origin of the occupational castes, Luling argued that they belonged to the Cushitic speaking population residing in the Horn of Africa, which is the earliest traceable population in the region. Most probably, they became established as distinct groups through functional differentiation. Separation, even social segregation, ritualized division of functions and the establishment of an ‘out group’ within the larger Somali society was a common cultural feature among various peoples in the Horn. This means, contrary to the legend about the ‘foreign’ background of some of the outcasts, Midgaan, Tumaal and Yiban as well as their counterparts in southern Somalia were Somali by origin. There were no substantial physical, linguistic or cultural differences between the occupational castes and the pastoral-nomads.25 Already in 1958, I.M. Lewis together with a medical doctor had investigated into ‘biological’ differences between Sab (low status) and Samaale (high status) groups in northern Somalia. The researcher did not find any significant differences.26

Regarding the farming villagers along and between the two main rivers in southern Somalia, Luling came to the conclusion that they were clearly separate in origin from the rest of the Somali. Physically, they differed visibly from the pastoral-nomads and they originally spoke Bantu-languages. Many of them, like the Gosha/
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Jareer, were descendants of run-away slaves. Eastern Africans, e.g., from today’s Tanzania, had been brought into the Somali peninsula in the 19th century as slaves, passing through on the way to the Arab peninsula, or being sold along the southern Somali coast as workers on plantations. Some of these non-Somali, Bantu-speaking farmers in the south, however, most probably have already resided in the area before Somali pastoral-nomads settled there, or arrived simultaneously with the Somali groups. Since they occupied different ecological niches, they could have coexisted without competition. Over time, the farming villagers – ex-slaves or free farmers – were integrated in the larger Somali society, but with an inferior status.

Luling stressed that caste groups and farming villagers were not categorically separated. Particularly in southern Somalia, there was in some cases considerable overlap between them, and, e.g., the Eyle, who were both farmers and hunters. Luling stressed the complexities of historical and social relations between Somali pastoral-nomads, occupational castes and originally non-Somali farming communities. She emphasized that in most cases, not the physical appearance or any ‘objective’ marker, but socially constructed claims to a particular descent or origin provided clarity on a person’s belonging to a majority or a minority group.

In her later work, Luling investigated into the history and culture of some costal groups, commonly referred to as Benaadiri. Among them were the so-called Gibil Cad (‘light skinned’) groups. All pastoral-nomadic Somali groups claimed descent from Arabic sheikhs. From a historical and linguistic perspective this was, however, a rather dubious claim. Most researchers on the Horn agreed that the Cushitic speaking groups in the Horn originated from an area which today is in south-western Ethiopia. In contrast, ethnographic, historical and linguistic research confirmed that among the Gibil Cad of the Benaadir coast (between Mogadishu and Kismayo in the south) Arabic or Iranian ancestors played a decisive role. According to Luling, ‘Their appearances witnesses to it, since most of them are noticeably, as their name declares, lighter skinned than Somalis generally.’

The Benaadiri groups lived mainly in the port cities along the southern Somali coast, such as Mogadishu, Merka and Brawa. Benaadiri comes from ‘Bandar’ which is the Persian word for ‘port’; the name Benaadiri is a purely geographic reference and does not imply any ‘Benaadiri descent’ equivalent to the descent line of a majority clan member. Many of them were traders by profession. They lived as endogamous group and also had their own dialect that was markedly different from ‘standard’ Somali. Luling stressed that there were also Gibil Cad communities further inland,
in the Shabelle valley, where they lived in close relation to such groups as Geledi and Begedi around Afgoye. They traced their origin back to Arabia and constituted themselves as endogamous group. But in contrast to the costal Gibil Cad groups, they practiced farming and took over many aspects of the culture and language of the majority groups in the area.31

Among the most well-known of the Benaadiri groups were Reer Xamar (Reer Hamar)32 and Asharaf. Traditionally, the Reer Xamar resided in the two oldest districts of Mogadishu, Xamarweyne and Shangani and spoke a very particular dialect not understood by most other Somali. Besides being traders, they also worked as goldsmiths. There are four Reer Xamar sub-groups: Moorshe, Iskashato, Dhabarweyne and Bandhabow. Some of them claimed foreign origin (from Yemen or Persia) while others, like the Moorshe, regarded themselves as descendants of the Ajuraan, a pastoral-nomadic group that ruled in the southern Somali hinterland in the seventeenth and eighteenth century and is generally subsumed under Hawiye.33

The Asharaf were already mentioned above as religious specialists. In an unpublished note on this group Luling provided the following information: The Asharaf were held to be descended from the Prophet Maxamed’s daughter Fatima and her husband Cali (the nephew of the Prophet). Fatima’s and Cali’s sons, Xasan and Xuseyn, constituted the two main branches of the group. The branch of Xuseyn was subdivided in Reer Sharif Maqbuul, Sharif Axmed and Sharif Ba’alawi. The subgroups of Xasan were Maxamed Sharif, Sharif Cali, Sharif Axmed and Ashraf Sarmaan. Besides these main groups, several smaller Asharaf lineages existed in places like Merka. Most of the members of the Xuseyn branch lived in the coastal towns such as Mogadishu. A few moved to other places in order to trade or because they bought land. The members of the Xasan branch resided mainly in the interior of the country and mostly were not considered Benaadiri. Some, like Asharaf Sarmaan, counted even as Gibil Madow (‘black skinned’).34 Those groups were mostly endogamous but not (yet) of inferior status. This changed with the outbreak of the civil war (see below).

Besides the minority groups for whom a certain specialization in Islamic religious services was characteristic, there was also a small minority of Somali Christians. Christianity had been introduced by European missionaries under the protection of the British and Italian colonial regimes in the late 19th and early 20th century. However, due to the stiff and in many places armed resistance of Somalis to anything diverting from the ‘correct faith’ (Sunni Islam), missionary activities were interdicted very soon by the colonial governments. The Italian cathedral in Mogadishu, which
mostly served the Italian administrators, remained as visible sign for Christianity in Somalia. In British Somaliland, a Somali Christian called Michael Mariano achieved political prominence in the 1950s and was involved in negotiating an end to British rule in the north. In post-colonial Somalia, a small community of Somali converts existed clandestinely in the country.

The Gosha or Jareer have already been mentioned as significant minority group in southern Somalia. The name Gosha means ‘dense jungle’ and denotes the forested banks of the Jubba River. This is where fugitive slaves hid and established their free communities. The jungle provided refuge and, due to the abundance of arable land, a living as farmer. The name of their residential area became also their group name. However, in Somali the ex-slaves of eastern African origin were also known as Jareer. This is a racist term. It refers to the ‘hard’ [curly] hair of the ‘African’ ex-slaves, in contrast to the ‘soft’ hair of the supposedly more ‘Arabic’ Somalis. Later, in the 1990s, the Gosha/Jareer became also known as Somali-Bantu. This term will be explained further in the next section dealing with the civil war. Also those Bantu-speakers who were not brought as slaves to Somalia but had resided in the area before the arrival of the pastoral-nomadic groups were subsumed under this category. The Gosha/Jareer kept some of their older ‘African’ traditions and some kept their original Bantu language. They did not intermarry with pastoral-nomadic Somali. Once slavery had been officially abolished by the Italians in southern Somalia in 1904, many freed slaves joined the Gosha/Jareer communities.

Among the sub-divisions of Gosha/Jareer are Zigua or Mushunguli, who are descendants of slaves, and Makanne and Shidle, who trace their ancestors back to free farmers. At the beginning of the 20th century, tens of thousands of Gosha/Jareer resided along the Jubba. Soon, other groups including Somali pastoral-nomads and Oromo (from today’s eastern Ethiopia) settled in their area in the Jubba valley. Intermarriage occurred between Oromo and Gosha/Jareer. The nomads established their authority over the Gosha/Jareer who were considered to be of lower status as ex-slaves, ‘blacks’ and former infidels (converted to Islam only by their former masters). The inferior status of the Gosha/Jareer was perpetuated in post-colonial time. Formally Somali, they were effectively excluded from political power and most of the resources of the state. They, however, prospered as farmers until the state began in the mid-1970s to introduce a land-reform and rural development schemes. By establishing a complex registration system for land titles, many of the Gosha/Jareer farmers were disowned and members of pastoral-nomadic clans and particularly
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urban elites in Mogadishu became the formal land owners. The Gosha/Jareer continued to work on the land, but increasingly as dependent farmers.

The last minority group that shall be mentioned here are the Bajuni. They resided in small communities along the Indian Ocean coastline and on some of the larger offshore islands between Kismayo (Somalia) and Mombasa (Kenya). Some also reside in the larger urban settings like Kismayo, Mogadishu and Brava. In general, Bajuni is a relatively small group of a few thousand people. They were of mixed Arab, Bantu, Somali and perhaps Malaysian origin. Their mother-tongue was Kibajuni, which is a dialect of Swahili.

In general, most of these groups were subsumed under the umbrella of the Somali identity for much of the 20th century. Most of the minority group members spoke Somali at least as ‘second language’ adhered to a similar culture and were Sunni Muslims. Linguistic and cultural differences were most prevalent between the Gosha/Jareer and Somali majority groups/dominant clans. Many Gosha/Jareer actually spoke the Af-Maay dialect common in the interriverine area, which was also spoken by Raxanweyn. But Af-Maxaa, the dialect spoken by the pastoral-nomadic groups, was officially declared as ‘standard Somali’ in the early 1970s. Some Gosha/Jareer also spoke their old Bantu language, like Kizigula. Everyday stigmatisation and unequal treatment of minority group members persisted in post-colonial Somalia (the country became independent in 1960). This concerned particularly those who were visibly different, like Gosha/Jareer, but also other ‘weak’ groups (weakness was evaluated on basis of manpower and access to political resources). Only when under the socialist government of Maxamed Siyad Barre (1969-1991) ‘clanism’ was officially ruled out and even the mentioning of one’s clan was considered a criminal offense in the early 1970s, minority-majority group distinctions seemingly lost relevance. Officially, every Somali was equal. Barre deliberately promoted members of minority groups (e.g., Midgaan and Tumaal) into high political and military positions. The most prominent of them was Maxamed Cali Samatar, who acquired the rank of a general and served as Vice-President and Minister of Defense. However, beneath the surface the exclusion from economic and political resources continued, and particularly Gosha/Jareer were treated as second-class citizens. Menkhaus found that for the farmers along the Jubba, ‘the state served not as an instrument of protection and rule of law […] but rather as an instrument by which powerful ethnic Somalis expropriated [their] land, not by force of arms but by with bureaucracy and legal documents.’

When the government began to face challenges after Somalia
had lost the Ogaden war against Ethiopia (1977-78), which led to a severe economic and refugee crisis in Somalia and marked the beginning of armed opposition against President Barre’s rule, clanism was re-introduced forcibly – but only ‘behind the curtain’. Maxamed Siyad Barre armed loyal groups to fight side by side with the national army against the ‘rebels’.40 Also minority group members joined this struggle for power on the side of the government. Many of them were grateful to Barre for having enhanced their prestige and accepted them as ‘full Somalis’.41 It has to be noted that, in general, members of minority groups had been scattered throughout Somalia and were attached as clients to majority clans. This meant that they accepted also partly their patrons clan identity and culture, including language or dialect. Against this background, one can argue that a clear distinction between minority and majority group existed with regard to social status and access to economic and political resources. However, most members of minority groups had not yet developed a precise and fully conscious identity of their own. This changed with the dynamics of violence that unfolded from 1991 onward.42

Civil War

Maxamed Siyad Barre lost his grip on power in January 1991. The Somali state collapsed in civil war, which pitted clan militias led by warlords against each other. In this context, the situation of the members of the minority groups worsened dramatically. They were the weakest groups in Somali society, since they were relatively few in numbers (except the Gosha/Jareer) and not armed. Regarding the ‘numbers’, however, one needs to be careful. Some argue that the so-called minority groups constituted – taken together or at least in certain localities – actually a majority group. Up to 20 percent of the entire Somali population of around nine million were estimated to belong to minority groups.43 Still, they were splintered within society and lacked political and military organisation. Unlike the majority clans, the minority groups had no tradition of fighting; only the Gosha had engaged in a rebellion against slavery in the early 20th century;44 but this did not result in the development of a ‘warrior ethos’ so typical for pastoral-nomadic Somali groups. In fact, all of the minority groups including the cast groups had always relied on majority clans for protection.45

During the civil war, this relationship of protection was dissolved and in many cases turned into its opposite, with majority group militias preying on weak elements in society, such as women, children, the old and members of minority groups. Mili-
tias belonging to the Hawiye and the Darood clan-families plundered property and farms, enslaved boys and men as workers and girls and women for housework and sexual services. Raping and killing became endemic. This concerned also majority groups in conflict. However, their members had a chance to defend themselves and demand their rights since they were armed or had a militia protecting them. The predicament of the unarmed and unorganized minority groups was encapsulated in the Somali expression loo ma ooyin (‘not cried for’, ‘not mourned for’). There was no redress for them.

Many of those minority group members who survived the early phase of the civil war fled Somalia. The first stations of their journey were usually refugee camps in Kenya or homes in Eastlight, the Somali quarter of Nairobi. Some also fled within Somalia. From the mid-1990s onward, Somaliland and later Puntland in northern Somalia had emerged as state-like entities that provided their inhabitants with relative peace, although this did not yet mean an end to structural discrimination and stigmatization of minority group members there. A considerable number of minority group members remained in (southern) Somalia. They did not have the financial means to flee, were too old, sick or disabled and therefore could not move, or hoped that things would become better soon. In general, however, their suffering continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as documented in the report of the joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Somalia:

“Generally members of the various minority groups were and still are unarmed and they were very often victims of the killings, lootings, rapes, abductions, exclusions, displacements and other forms of aggression committed by members of the major Somali clan-based militias.”

Beside these general dynamics of violence concerning members of minority groups, one can distinguish the suffering of different groups and also at different times. Certain minority groups suffered more than others. Among those suffering most were the Gosha/Jareer. Between 1991 and 1992 clan militias fought heavily to control farmland in the south. They looted and abused civilians who lived as farmers along the rivers Jubba and Shabelle and inbetween. The fighting over the farmland (which not only concerned the Bantu but also the Raxanweyn agro-pastoralists in the regions Bay and Bakool) contributed to the escalation of a periodic drought in
the area into a famine in 1992. In this war-induced famine, around 300,000 people died, many of them Raxanweyn, but also many Gosha/Jareer. From October 1992 onward, Gosha/Jareer started fleeing into Kenya, where soon more than 10,000 of them lived in several refugee camps that were later combined as ‘Dadab camp’. In the refugee camps, the Gosha/Jareer began to organize themselves politically and tried to increase their stake in Somali politics. An activist called Maxamed R. Arbow founded the Somali African Muki Organisation (SAMO). This attempt to give Gosha/Jareer a voice failed, however, because the UN, which together with the USA had started a humanitarian intervention in southern Somalia in November 1992, ignored them and gave precedence to the warlords as ‘political leaders’ in Somalia. Another dynamic in the refugee camps, however, influenced the fate of the Gosha/Jareer tremendously. Due to the fact that some Gosha/Jareer spoke a Bantu-language, the UN and humanitarian organizations in the camps began to refer to them as ‘Somali-Bantu’. This together with the experience of long-term exclusion and recent extreme suffering fostered the formation of a collective identity among Gosha/Jareer that gained significance outside Somalia. The Somali-Bantu were quickly identified as among the most vulnerable people by the UN and others and therefore gained preferential access to humanitarian aid. Some Somali Bantu sought to capitalize on their ‘African’ heritage (which had been a reason for their stigmatization in Somalia) and applied for ‘resettlement’ in their ancestors’ home areas in Tanzania. In 1999, the government of the USA accepted up to 12,000 Somali Bantu refugees for resettlement. In this way, being Somali-Bantu turned out advantageous, since it potentially provided a ‘ticket’ out of the misery.

Still, many Somali-Bantu continued to suffer also in the refugee camps, where they were excluded by other Somalis and resided in areas that lacked protection and therefore were affected by nightly attacks of bandits from inside and outside the camp. When around 10,000 Somali Bantu finally resettled to the USA in 2004, they faced new exclusion by the residential Somali population there due to their inferior status in Somali society. Those Gosha/Jareer or Somali-Bantu who remained inside Somalia over the past two decades since 1991 were frequently forced into a slave-like status by militias belonging to majority clans, who made them work on the local banana plantations.

Another group that suffered tremendously were the Reer Xamar. They were much fewer in numbers than, e.g., the Gosha/Jareer. They were looted and the ‘white-skinned’ girls and women were raped. Many girls were also forced into marriages
with members of militia groups. While these forced marriages certainly violated the rights of the girls, they provided the Reer Xamar families involved with some kind of protection from their in-laws belonging to majority clans in the longer run.\textsuperscript{58}

A minority group which, according to Cassanelli, did partly even well out of civil war (at least for some time) were the Bajuni. They did not suffer from particularly heavy attacks in the early 1990s. Their maritime mobility helped to avoid many dangers. Cassanelli found that ‘Some even earned money-as much as US$400 per passenger, transporting refugees from places like Brava and Kismayu to Kenya in their fishing boats.’\textsuperscript{59} In general, however, also Bajuni suffered due to their inferior social and political status. Many of them fled to refugee camps in Kenya, particularly around Mombasa. Cassanelli stressed that

“Many Bajunis relocate to Kenya because their capacity to market fish and repair their boats in Somalia continues to be threatened by the presence of armed militias, who typically steal their equipment and resell it at exorbitant prices. A former UN official recently told me that a quick impact project that donated nets to help restart a fishing cooperative in Kismayu was handed over to the leaders of the dominant factions in the area. When the fraudulent recipients realized they did not know how to use the nets, they simply cut up the nets of local Bajuni fishermen, thus compelling the latter to buy the donated equipment. In these circumstances, many impoverished Bajuni will not be able to repatriate to Somalia with any promise of security. Their ability to earn a living in Somalia may be at an end. At the same time, with only a handful of educated professionals and overseas residents, the Bajuni are unlikely to have the means or the contacts to emigrate in large numbers.”\textsuperscript{60}

The worst times for members of minority groups were certainly the first two years of the civil war in the south. This was the time of massive inter-clan fighting, clan-cleansing and famine. It was followed by a calmer period when the UN and US-led humanitarian intervention forces (UNOSOM and UNITAF) were in southern Somalia from November 1992 to May 1995. While fighting never stopped, the intensity of the violence was reduced in places such as Mogadishu and surroundings, where the
troops were concentrated. Members of minority groups as well as most other Somalians enjoyed relative security at that time. But with the withdrawal of the international ‘peace keepers’, minority groups became vulnerable again. A pattern that emerged from interviews with asylum seekers belonging to Somali minority groups that were conducted by the author between 2005 and 2013 is that those who remained in Somalia after 1991 were often subjected to local protection rackets, particularly between 1995 and 2006. In this context, clan militias controlling certain areas would demand regular payment from shop owners or manual workers belonging to minority groups. The amounts were small, but taken together the revenue extracted from a neighborhood could provide a small militia group with money for qaad (a mild stimulant chewed by many Somali men, particularly soldiers and militiamen) and other incidentals. If people refused to pay their homes and shops were attacked. Members of minority groups could not rely on clan-protection against such attacks. In this way, local economies of war were established that held minority group members in a status of permanent dependency on the will of majority group members in their areas and generated some regular income for the militiamen. The regular extraction of money prevented many minority group members also from saving money for an eventual flight.

The second period in which life for members of minority groups became temporarily better was from June to December 2006. In these six months, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) controlled first Mogadishu and soon afterwards much of southern Somalia (after its forces had defeated the warlord militias in Mogadishu). The UIC followed an Islamist ideology that officially disregarded clan belonging.\textsuperscript{61} The UIC was concerned with law and order. According to a woman from a majority group who was married to a Reer Xamar man, and whose children lived in Mogadishu, the situation was better under the UIC. Looting and robbing became less.\textsuperscript{62} Also interviews with members of minority groups who, after new violence had escalated in southern Somalia from 2007 onward, sought asylum in Europe confirmed that the time under the courts had been better for them. Finally, a report by the Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Immigration Service, which was finalized in August 2007 and included primary data from a field mission in March 2007 as well as secondary literature, confirmed that ‘the UIC provided the minorities with some kind of protection and freedom. There was an enormous relief among the minorities when the UIC took over in June 2006. Many members of minorities were accorded prominent or high positions in the UIC administration, in the education and health
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sectors. However, these ‘moments of freedom’ could not be enjoyed everywhere to the same extent. While some UIC fighters had an Islamic agenda which could be perceived as less discriminatory against minorities, others were simply warlord-militias turned Islamic militias and continued, under the cover of the UIC, their old violent and criminal ways.

The UIC was rejected by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its allies. The TFG had been established in Kenya in 2004 and enjoyed the support of the neighboring states in the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia, and of the west. But in Somalia, it was perceived a government dominated by warlords and by members of the Darood clan-family; it had little internal support and could not govern effectively. It was not even welcome in Mogadishu, which was in the hands of members of the Hawiye clan-family many of whom sympathized with the Islamists. Ethiopia strongly backed the TFG and in late December 2006, around 14,000 Ethiopian troops intervened in southern Somalia, defeated the UIC within one week, and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. Subsequently, remnants of the UIC and newly established Islamist groups on the one side fought against the TFG and its foreign allies on the other. Al Shabaab, a hard-core Islamist group that had separated from the UIC in late 2006, emerged as the strongest armed Islamist movement in the following years.

Between 2009 and 2011, Al Shabaab controlled much of southern Somalia. Its rule was based on a very strict and narrow interpretation of Islamic Shari’a and was perceived as extremely harsh by many Somalis. But also Al Shabaab’s enemies, the TFG and its allies, subjected civilians that were perceived as pro-Islamists to a brutal regime of urban warfare and terror. Moreover, the clan element featured again prominently in Al Shabaab. On the one hand, Al Shabaab sought to transcend clan-belonging through religious ideology; on the other, majority clans dominated the movement’s leadership and certain minority groups, like Somali-Bantu, were singled out for forcible recruitment. To make things more complex, there were also observers who stressed that traditionally underprivileged groups like Somali-Bantu voluntarily joined Al Shabaab in masses since it offered them respect and upward social mobility, based on common ideology. Members of minority groups who were caught up in the fighting found it hard to flee and move around to secure places, as they were not easily accepted in new surroundings. This was different for refugees from major clans, who had a wider social network and could rely on clan protection in different areas. As could be expected, the few Somali Christians in the country faced most severe consequences if they were discovered by Al Shabaab. In some ca-
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ses, Somali-Bantu had converted to Christianity in protest against the mistreatment they and their people had experienced on the hands of their ‘Somali co-nationals’ professing Islam. Between 2008 and 2012, Al Shabaab beheaded a number of Christian Somalis. Therefore, it is safe to argue that as in the early 1990s, the fighting in southern Somalia in the years 2007 to 2012 impinged most negatively on the most vulnerable members of society, which were the members of minority groups.

Another interesting phenomenon related to the civil war that had a considerable impact on minority group ‘identity’ formation was the asylum regime, particularly in Europe. As mentioned above: members of minority groups had been scattered throughout Somalia and were attached as clients to majority clans; this had prevented group cohesion before 1991. According to international law, individuals enjoyed protection if they could prove that they were persecuted in their country of origin on the basis of their ethnic identity, faith, political or sexual orientation. As already mentioned, the Gosha/Jareer/Somali-Bantu identity became a resource in the Kenyan refugee camps in the early 1990s, when the UN and humanitarian NGOs identified them as ‘most vulnerable’ group and offered preferential access to assistance and finally, some Somali-Bantu made it to Tanzania while others were allowed resettlement in the USA.

Similar developments took place regarding other minority group identities with regard to asylum in Europe. In the early 2000s, when several European governments held the view that the ‘worst days’ in Somalia were over and the transitional government was supposed to establish order in the country again, claiming minority group identity was a relative secure way of getting asylum in Europe. If a person could prove that he/she belonged either to Midgaan or Asharaf or a similar group, and had faced – as members of such a group – systematic persecution in Somalia – and this prosecution would continue if returned – he/she had a relatively strong claim to asylum. Needless to say that also members of majority groups who hoped for a better life outside collapsed Somalia tried to ‘fake’ a minority group identity to gain entrance into Europe. European governments became in this context increasingly sophisticated in conducting ‘identity checks’ on Somali asylum seekers. Representatives of the Home Office in the UK, for example, referred intensively to (sometimes ethnographic) reports about the Somali clan-system and the culture of minority groups, and relied on linguistic expertise to establish if a claimant exhibited the ‘typical’ features of the group he/she claimed to belong to, including dialect. In some cases, claimants who belonged to a majority group managed to ‘change’ their
identity successfully and gained access to Europe, e.g., as Midgaan or Asharaf. At the surface, they had to uphold this identity in order to avoid negative consequences for their status in Europe. In this way, some minority groups ‘proliferated’ in Europe. The negative consequence of this process for minority groups members was that some of them, who were less well oriented in their own identity, since they were illiterate, traumatized, scared or lacked knowledge due to their upbringing during times of fighting when family structures were destroyed, sometimes had difficulties in passing the meticulous ‘identity check’ of European governments.

The Situation of Minority Groups in Somaliland and Puntland

The situation of members of minority groups in northern Somalia was slightly better than in the south since 1991. The northwest had undergone a first round of civil war already in the late 1980s. When local guerrillas took over the northwest in 1991, they called for a cease-fire between the clans in the region, some of which had sided with the government in Mogadishu. While President Barre was ousted from Mogadishu by other guerrillas and new fighting for power between these guerrillas erupted in the south, people in the northwest managed to establish peace and order through a series of local clan conferences. On this basis, Somaliland was founded as ‘independent’ state, which did not enjoy international recognition but functioned as de facto state. A few years later, a very similar process took place in the northeast, where Puntland was founded in 1998. In contrast to Somaliland, Puntland does not claim independence but considers itself as autonomous regional state that manages its own affairs until an effective government has been established in Mogadishu again.69

The minority groups that traditionally resided in the north (mostly, Midgaan, Tu-maal and Yibir) therefore were spared the extreme violence from which the groups residing in the south suffered from 1991 onward. They were never systematically persecuted and oppressed by clan militias, as were, e.g., the Gosha/Jareer along the Jubba in 1991 and 1992. However, they suffered from the persistent discrimination and stigmatization by the pastoral-nomadic groups. Despite the attempts to social reform under President Barre in the early 1970s, intermarriage between minority group members and those of the local majority clans was not accepted, Midgaan and others were prevented from owning land, and they were discriminated in schools and jobs. Northern Somalis, who strongly adhered to a pastoral-nomadic
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ethos, had always been more conservative than people in the south. But in some regards the situation of minorities improved after the fall of the old government. At least in Somaliland, Midgaan began to organize themselves and systematically sent their children to schools. In Hargeysa, the capital of Somaliland, a private school for Midgaan and other minority group children was opened, financed through a donation by a prominent minority group member, the singer Mariam Mursal. The aim was, first, to shelter the children from harassment by the children from majority groups, and to empower Migdaan and others through education. Midgaan also gained representation in the Somaliland parliament, but only with one out of 82 seats in the lower house. This seat was lost in the parliamentary elections in 2005. In 2012, the parliament rejected a proposal for a quota for women and minorities in parliament.

When the violence escalated in the south in the early 1990s and again after 2006, some minority group members from there also sought refuge in Somaliland. Those who had money or social connections could establish themselves, integrate to some degree and enjoy peace. Others had to settle in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), which offered only very basic shelter, but lacked appropriate infrastructure. People in IDP camps suffered from extreme poverty and particularly women and children there were vulnerable to sexual abuse by men from local majority groups.

The situation in Puntland was worse. Members of the minority groups in the northeast had no political representation at all within the parliament. Hill found in his report on the state of minorities in Somalia that ‘Puntland has provided little protection or assistance to minorities, whether communities long established in the region (mainly the occupational groups) or IDPs from southern Somalia (mostly Bantu, but with some occupational groups and Benadir).’ The international NGO Medicines Sans Frontieres (MSF) reported 2008 about the conditions in refugee camps in Bosaso (Puntland):

“There are currently some 30,000 people living under harsh conditions in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) settlements scattered throughout the town. Since the second half of 2007 security in Puntland has deteriorated. It became more difficult for humanitarian organisations to operate […]. Consequences for the displaced were reduction of expatriate
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presence and lack of adequate humanitarian assistance […]. The majority of the newly arrived Somalis (including those coming from the Ogaden region) stayed with relatives or friends in IDP settlements. Living conditions there are extremely precarious.”

The human rights situation in Puntland continued to deteriorate in the following years. The most vulnerable groups, particularly IDPs including many minority group members, suffered from insecurity and violence due to Islamist attacks, piracy and harsh reaction by regional security forces:

“In Puntland, the human rights situation deteriorated in the past few months, as a result of measures undertaken by the government to step up security in the face of increased infiltration by armed militants from the south. These included the forced transfer of some 900 male IDPs from Bossasso to Galkayo, restrictions on the media, including the imprisonment of a journalist for six years and other measures which are limiting the space of civil society.”

Conclusion: Continuities and Changes Regarding the Status of Minority Groups

Minority groups were long disregarded by members of majority clans. External observers rarely paid much attention to their particular history, culture and situation. In fact, the perspective on Somali society as one of the most ‘homogenous’ in Africa, characterized as ‘pastoral democracy’ and segmentary lineage society in which an egalitarian ethos reigned among the pastoral-nomads concealed the extent to which, first, Somali society had always been ethnically and culturally diverse (but still, less diverse than most other African societies), and second, how little egalitarian Somali society was – viewed from the perspective of the ‘low castes’ or ‘outcasts’. Groups like the Gosha/Jareer/Somali Bantu were not even small in numbers, but were held in a state of inferiority – by force first (until the early 20th century), by social and political exclusion and bureaucratic regulations and laws later (until the 1980s), and then by force again (under the warlords in the 1990s).
The revolutionary government under Maxamed Siyad Barre undertook initial steps toward a comprehensive social reform including the status of minority groups, by outlawing any reference to clan and prohibiting marriage taboos between various groups. However, the success of this reform was limited. While a few individuals belonging to minority groups were elevated to top political and military positions and some ‘spectacular’ intermarriages between members of minority and majority groups were organized in Mogadishu, in practice discrimination and seclusion continued – partly self-imposed, partly enforced by supposedly superior over supposedly inferior groups.

The outbreak of the civil war in 1991 led to two contradictory developments. On the one hand, the predicament of members of minority groups worsened. When inter-group violence escalated at so far unprecedented levels, the previously existing relationships of dependency and protection were severed. Sheegat groups, who had so far been looked down upon but were in some regards, particularly regarding customary law, integrated into stronger groups, had to face looting, raping and killing militiamen without protection by their erstwhile patrons. Also the status of loosely attached or unattached groups who were simply considered ‘different’ by the majority population but were respected, e.g., for their religious knowledge and blessing (Asharaf) and skills in trade and craftsmanship (Reer Xamar) before 1991, changed. They became disrespected and unprotected groups. Without doubt did the Somali civil war cause mayhem among all Somalis; but members of minority groups were hit hardest, they were the most vulnerable due to the fact that they had never really been firmly integrated into the state apparatus and lacked the ‘warrior ethos’ of the pastoral nomadic groups, most of which had their own militia when the state collapsed.

On the other hand, the dynamics of violence in Somalia that triggered massive flight of minority group members outside of their traditional home areas (to neighboring countries, to Europe and North America or to northern Somalia) fostered the formation of a conscious minority group identity. Encouraged and supported by humanitarian organizations, individual Bantu or Midgaan, for instance, took the challenge and stood up against the massive discrimination and victimization of their groups. In this process, minority group identities gained strengths, which led to more internal cohesion. In the case of the Somali-Bantu, being ‘African’ and not ‘Somali’ suddenly became an asset and facilitated resettlement in Tanzania or even the USA. Of course, such group identities became also attractive for members of
minority clans who intended to ‘fake’ their ways abroad. In this way, some majority clan members turned into Asharaf or Midgaan, and those who succeeded continue to live with that ‘new’ identity abroad, which might cause interesting social complications among the descendants of those identity-changers.\textsuperscript{75}

The social exclusion of minority group members by ‘ordinary’ Somalis facilitated their strong support of the UIC in 2006. The Islamists promised respect based on common religious/ideological convictions. While the rule of the Islamic courts was short-lived, after 2006 Al Shabaab continued the official ideology which saw all Muslims (adhering to the version of Islam Al Shabaab propagated) as brothers. This attracted some minority group members to the movement. In fact, however, clan chauvinism played a role in Al Shabaab and in some cases members of minority groups were forcibly recruited or were used as cannon fodder.

Politically and with regard to education, members of minority groups made some headway, particularly in Somaliland, where, e.g., Midgaan began to organize themselves and work for the improvement of their own communities in the absence of a government policy on minorities. In Puntland, the situation of minority group members remained dire. However, in the whole north members of minority groups were spared the massive violence to which the minority groups in the south were exposed. The Somali government in Mogadishu under President Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud, which was formed in mid-2012, included two members of minority groups in the cabinet of ten ministers. However, in the face of decades of the structural discrimination and violent oppression of minorities, this can only be seen as a very first step toward finding a human-right conform way of dealing with minority groups in Somalia, respecting their culture and providing them with equal chances like other Somalis.

Markus V. Hoehne, PhD, is a research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale, Germany.
Minorities in Somalia


2 It has to be kept in mind that this representation as ‘clan-based society’ is contested by many Somali intellectuals, who perceive it as a colonial construction to divide and rule Somalis. Still, according to my own experiences during years of fieldwork in northern Somalia, patrilineal descent plays a major role in Somali society. This does not mean that it would be the only relevant factor in politics, economy or other matters of life; but it is quite important in many regards. Helpful discussions on the issue are provided by Luling, Virginia 2006: Genealogy as Theory, Genealogy as Tool: Aspects of Somali ‘Clanship’. Social Identities Vol. 12, No. 4: 471-485; Maxamed, Jama 2007: Kinship and Contract in Somali Politics. Africa Vol. 77, No. 2: 226-249.

3 Somali clan and place names in this text follow the Somali orthography. The Latin ‘c’ stands for a sound close to the Arabic ‘ъ’ (ayn); ‘x’ denotes ‘ъ’ (ha), as in, e.g., in Gibil Cad or Raxanweyn.


12 Kirk, Yibirs and Midgaans, p. 95.


15 Kirk, Yibirs and Midgaans, pp. 95-99.


17 Lewis, People of the Horn, p. 51.

18 Lewis, People of the Horn, p. 52.

19 Lewis, People of the Horn, p. 149.

20 Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, p. 149; italics in the original.

21 Luling, The other Somali, p. 39.

22 Luling, The other Somali, p. 41.

23 Luling, The other Somali, p. 42.

24 Luling, The other Somali, p. 42.

25 Luling, The other Somali, pp. 43-44.

Minorities in Somalia


28 Luling, The other Somali, p. 48.

29 Luling, The other Somali, p. 51.


31 Luling, Farmers from Arabia, p. 302.

32 This literally means ‘people of Hamar’, with Hamar (meaning ‘red’) being an old name for Mogadishu.


37 There are other smaller groups in southern Somalia that are not treated here, since there is little known on these groups. Many of them are generally included in the categories Benaadiri or Gibil Cad.


41 Interview with Awrala Gurxaan Guuleed, Ceerigaabo, May 2004.

42 Helander, Vulnerable minorities, p. 23.


44 Helander, Vulnerable minorities, p. 22.

45 Hill, No redress, p. 7.


47 Schlee stressed that under Somali customary law the differential fighting power of the groups in conflict was taken into consideration and stronger groups had a better chance to get ‘their rights’; Schlee, Günther 2013: Customary law and the joys of statelessness: idealised traditions versus Somali realities. Journal of Eastern African Studies Vol. 7, No. 2: 258-271, pp. 262-263.

48 Hill, No redress, p. 9.

49 Report on minority groups in Somalia by the joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya, from 17 to 24 September 2000, p. 20.

50 Also the Raxanweyn agro-pastoralists in the regions Bay and Bakool suffered from the militias clashing over the control of their fertile land. Since Raxanweyn, however, is not counted as a minority group it is not dealt with in this chapter. Still, among the majority groups Raxanweyn is the most underprivileged, and together with the members of minority groups Raxanweyn bore the brunt of the fighting in southern Somalia in the early 1990s.


53 Muki refers to a tree that is used in Gosh/ Jareer rituals.


Minorities in Somalia

57 Prunier, Somalia, p. 3.
59 Cassanelli, Violence and vulnerable groups, n.p.
60 Cassanelli, Violence and vulnerable groups, n.p.
61 Still, the courts entailed a clan element. The UIC consisted of a dozen different courts; the individual courts were mostly manned by members of the same lineage (at the highest genealogical level, they belonged to the Hawiye clan-family).
62 Interview with Sarah Cali Cadaawe, Hargeysa, 17.05.2009.
64 Hoehne, Markus V. 2009: Counter-terrorism in Somalia, or: how external interferences helped to produce militant Islamism. Available online under: http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/somalia/
66 Interview with Sarah Cali Cadaawe, Hargeysa, 17.05.2009; Hill, No redress, p. 23.
67 Ibid., p. 20.
70 Hill, No redress, p. 18.
72 Hill, No redress, p. 19.
73 MSF 2008: No Choice: Somali and Ethiopian refugees, asylum seekers and migrants crossing the Gulf of Adan, p. 29.
Migration from Somalia to Europe – A Statistical Overview

Martin Hofmann & David Reichel

Introduction

This article analyzes migration flows and stocks from Somalia to Europe from a purely quantitative perspective. The analysis uses available migration statistics and draws conclusions on the basis of the data they provide. It does not aim at providing underlying and more in-depth explanations for the observed quantitative trends. By use of immigration and asylum statistics, it describes size and trends of migration flows from Somalia to Europe from 2003 to 2012, identifies the main European countries of destination and analyzes if and how Somali migration to these countries has changed over time.

International migration and asylum statistics are not yet fully harmonized, neither at the European nor global level. Statistics on migration from Somalia are also not fully comprehensive or comparable; however, the available data allow for identifying and describing the main quantitative developments and trends. The analysis is restricted to countries and time periods for which comparable data are available. Since data collection practices have changed over time and – more importantly – vary from country to country, there is no guarantee of full comparability of data. However, many efforts have been put into the harmonization of statistical data at the level of the European Union in the past years, which allows for providing a basic picture of migration from Somalia to Europe. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the provided figures should be perceived as indicators for certain trends and developments rather than giving a fully accurate analysis of the situation in quantitative terms.

The conflict in Somalia and its impact on migration from Somalia to Europe and around the world

Since the days of independence in 1960, the newly formed Republic of Somalia uniting the former colonial states of Somalia and Somaliland has undergone several conflicts while peaceful periods were rare. Over the last 30 years the on-going con-
Conflict has “mutated from a civil war, through state collapse, clan factionalism and warlordism, to a globalized ideological conflict”.¹ Never ending crisis and conflict have forced large parts of the population to flee the country. It is estimated that today app. 14% of an estimated total population of 7.4 million Somalis are living abroad. The majority of those – in their majority – forced emigrants have remained in the region; a smaller share of them has managed to reach countries of destination in Europe and Northern America. The exodus from Somalia mainly unfolded over the last twenty years as a result of the civil war 1988-91², implying that among the “new migrations” to Europe, the Somali migration is already a more established one.

Immigration from Somalia to Europe

The total number of Somali citizens registered in Europe showed a comparatively stable trend over the last decade. For those European countries where annual data is available for the years 2003 to 2012, the total number of Somali citizens increased from app. 113,000 in 2003 to app. 140,000 in 2012,³ representing an overall increase of 23.4% over the last decade. Thus, related Eurostat figures refer to the total stock of Somali citizens in a given year but do not take into account previous naturalizations. This implies that the number of persons “born in Somalia” and residing in Europe is in reality significantly higher. At the same time, during the last decade there was a considerable shift between European countries regarding the number of Somali citizens they were hosting on their territories. The United Kingdom, the European country with close historical ties with Somalia and thus a “traditional” country of immigration for Somali citizens, remained the main country of destination for Somali migrants while observing a slight decrease of 8.2% between 2003 and 2012 (from a total of app. 61,000 Somali citizens in 2003 to a total of app. 56,000 in 2012; this decrease is likely to be linked to naturalizations). Over the same period, Sweden developed into the second main country of destination in Europe. The number of recorded Somali citizens almost tripled between 2003 and 2012 from a total of app. 8,600 to a total of app. 33,000 in 2012. The development of Sweden becoming the main “new” country of destination for Somali citizens has to be largely attributed to the high numbers of asylum seekers from Somalia moving to Sweden on an annual basis. Norway with a total of app. 11,400 Somali citizens, Denmark with a total of app. 8,000 and Finland with a total of app. 7,400 follow next on the list. Thus, Norway and Finland observed increases of app. 35.6% and app. 63.6%, whereas Denmark saw a decrease of app. 39.7% between 2003 and 2012.⁴
However, statistics on residents with Somali citizenship do not provide the full picture regarding size and distribution of migrants from Somalia in Europe. When looking at Eurostat data on “foreign born”, which is a better indicator on migrants compared to citizenship, it becomes evident that the number of Somali migrants in Europe has increased more significantly over the past decade. According to the statistics on “foreign born” some 240,000 migrants from Somalia resided in the EU, Norway and Switzerland in 2012. The number in the UK doubled to app. 100,000 between 2000 and 2012, implying that the country is still the most important destination of the Somali community in Europe. The number of Somalis in the second most important destination in Europe, Sweden, increased to some 40,000 in 2012. In the Netherlands app. 24,000 migrants from Somalia were reported for that year, followed by Norway with app. 21,000. Thus, there has not been much change in the Netherlands, but numbers have grown in Norway. Italy also reports some 11,000 migrants from Somalia, followed by Denmark with app. 10,000 and Finland with app. 9,000. Other important countries of destination were Germany (6,500 Somali citizens), Switzerland (4,500) and Belgium (2,700). The number of immigrants from Somalia in Austria was app. 850 in 2009 compared to 155 in 2003 and is perceived to have increased to over 1,500 in 2012. These numbers of course do not include naturalized Somali immigrants and illegal residents.

The concentration of citizens of Somalia in specific countries has not changed much over the past decade. Both in 2003 and 2012 roughly 85% of Somalis in Europe resided in five European countries (United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland). As stated above, when looking at the numbers of citizens of Somalia in the EU27 and EFTA there was a slight increase between 2003 and 2012 from app 113,000 to app 140,000 Somali citizens. In 2003 the UK hosted just over 50% (61,000) of all Somalis residing in the EU27 and EFTA countries. In 2012 around 40% (56,000) of Somalis in the EU and EFTA resided in the UK (the decrease is mostly attributed to naturalisations in the UK). In Sweden, the number of Somali citizens increased considerably over the past decade, hosting around a quarter of all Somalis in 2012.
Consequently, there was an increase in migrants from Somalia observable in the UK (but not in Somali citizens due to naturalization), Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Finland. The numbers appear to have decreased in Denmark and Germany. This trend is confirmed when looking at the migration flows of Somali citizens to the EU. Emigration by Somali citizens increased in Denmark between 2000 and 2003 (and dropped thereafter) and immigration decreased to almost zero from 2002 to 2006. In Germany, both immigration and emigration decreased after 2001, with slightly higher emigration numbers leading to constant outflow of Somalis until 2008. Highest immigration figures can be found in Sweden, followed by the UK (data available until 2005) and Norway. Norway is the only country, where a steady inflow of Somalis is observable ranging approximately from 1,000 to 2,000. Sweden, Italy, Finland and Switzerland experienced a strong increase in immigration by Somalis in the past decade, which, in all four countries, dropped sharply in 2011.
Asylum seekers from Somalia

For the year 2012 the UNHCR registered a total of 355,516 asylum applications lodged in Europe. The most important countries of origin were Afghanistan (32,972 applications or 9.3%), Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244(1999) – 23,902 applications or 6.7%), Syria (23,389 applications or 6.6%), the Russian Federation (20,522 applications or 5.8%) and Pakistan (19,757 applications or 5.6%). With a total of 17,088 applications (4.8%) Somalia ranked at position 7 among the most important countries of origin of asylum seekers in Europe. Traditionally, many Somalis migrating to Europe are in search for international protection. Thus, the number of Somali asylum seekers in Europe represents only a small share of the total population fleeing the country. For the year 2011, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were over 1 million refugees residing outside Somalia. Of those the majority of app. 518,000 was residing in Kenya. The second and third most important destination countries for refugees from Somalia were Yemen (205,000) and Ethiopia (185,000). Other countries hosted significantly lower numbers of refugees originating from Somalia. Countries with more than 10,000 refugees from Somalia were the United Kingdom, Djibouti, Sweden, the Netherlands, South Africa and Uganda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>517666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>204685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>185466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>19668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>19426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>17602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>15186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>14023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the high potential of Somali refugees at the global level, the number of asylum applications lodged in Europe on an annual basis has remained comparatively stable over the last decade. For those European countries where annual data are available for the years 2003 to 2012, the total number of applications showed only a slight increase of 7.5% between 2003 and 2012, from a total of 14,725 applications to a total of 15,830 applications. However, the annual application trends in European countries of destination showed significantly different developments over this period. In the United Kingdom, which had registered app. 50% of all applications in Europe in 2003, the total number of applications decreased by more than 90% over the last decade from a total of 7,195 in 2003 to a total of 680 applications in 2012. At the same time Sweden, Malta, Norway and Germany observed significant increases in annual applications (see figure 5 below).

In 2012, Sweden recorded the most asylum applications lodged by Somali citizens in Europe. With a total of 5,695 applications, the country received app. 36% of all Somali asylum applications in Europe for that year. In comparison to 2003, this figure implies an increase of app. 86% in annual applications from Somalia. Norway was the second most important country of destination (a total of 2,180 applications, plus 35% in comparison to 2003), followed by Germany (a total of 1,295 applications, more than four times more applications than in 2003), Malta (a total of 1,250 applications, almost 10 times more applications than in 2003), and Denmark (a total of 910 applications, almost 1.5 times more applications than in 2003). In 2003, the top five countries of destination in Europe received almost 72% of all applications lodged by Somali citizens in that year. Austria ranked at number 10 of the European countries of destination for Somali asylum seekers in Europe in 2012. The total number of 485 asylum applications implied an increase of app. 150% in comparison to 2003.

In 2012, a total of 10,085 first instance decisions were taken by EU Member States on asylum applications submitted by Somali citizens. A total of 1,670 applicants were granted refugee status, a total of 4,580 were granted subsidiary protection and a total of 100 a status on humanitarian reasons.
Irregular Migration

It is by definition not possible to precisely measure the size of irregular migration to Europe or the total number of irregular migrants residing on the territory of European States. Related estimates are based on extrapolations of other data sets like apprehensions at external borders or within the territory of States, asylum statistics, regularizations or expulsions/leave orders. These statistics refer to foreign nationals who do not - or no longer - fulfill the legal conditions for entry to, presence in or residence on the territory of a state. However, they do not provide information on the concrete migration history or motivations of the individuals affected. Thus, they have to be perceived as rather weak indicators for the real extent of irregular migration from a specific country of origin.

In the case of Somali migration to Europe, the available indicators are strongly related to the fact that many Somali migrants apply for asylum in European countries of destination. Rejections at the border are comparatively low and the – in comparison – high numbers of leave orders indicate that they mainly refer to rejected asylum seekers or individuals with unauthorized residence. The first statistics indicating the extent of irregular migration from Somalia to Europe are the numbers of orders to leave the country issued by European countries on an annual basis (leave orders).

Between 2008 to 2012, an average number of 10,000 leave orders were issued to Somali citizens in the EU and EFTA countries, which is app. 1.9% of all leave orders issued to third-country nationals in the EU and EFTA countries in the period 2008 to 2012. Most leave orders of Somalis were reported from Greece (almost 25,000 in 2008 to 2012), followed by the Netherlands (almost 10,000 from 2008 to 2011), Malta (app. 4,000) and the UK (3,600). Other countries reporting over 1,000 leave orders for those five years were Sweden, Finland, France and Belgium. Greece reported exceptionally high numbers for the years 2008 to 2010, in 2011 and 2012 leave orders decreased significantly. The Netherlands reported an increase in leave orders for Somali citizens from 2008 to 2011, but the data for 2012 were not available from Eurostat. While the numbers of decisions on expulsions in Malta were quite high in 2008, they decreased to almost zero in 2010 and increased again until 2012. The number in the UK decreased steadily over the years of observation.¹⁵
Figure 7: Leave orders issued to Somali citizens in Greece, the Netherlands, Malta and the UK 2008 to 2012

Residence permits and decision on asylum applications

According to the data reported to Eurostat, over 69,000 residence permits issued to Somali citizens were valid at the end of 2011 in the EU27 and Norway but excluding the UK and Denmark due to missing data. Most residence permits were issued in Sweden (almost 33,000 or 48%), followed by Italy (over 8,000 or 11.6%), Norway (7,500 or 11%), Finland (6,500 or 9.5%), the Netherlands (5,900 or 8.6%) and Germany (3,700 or 5.4%). The main reason for issuing residence permits to Somalis is subsidiary protection. The main countries of destination of Somali migration, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway issue the majority of residence permits for
Somali citizens based on this ground. The two other important reasons for granting residence permits to Somalis were also linked to the outcome of asylum procedures. Italy was the only country that also granted a significant number of residence permits for the reason of employment in 2011 (over 2,100). In most countries over 80% of residence permits for Somalis are valid for at least 12 months.\textsuperscript{17}

**Acquisitions of nationality**

Since 2003, app 108,000 naturalizations of Somali citizens have been reported in the EU27, Norway and Switzerland. Over 70,000 of those acquisitions of citizenship, making up more than two thirds, were recorded in the United Kingdom. Other countries with significant numbers of naturalizations of Somalis were Norway (over 12,000 since 2003), Sweden (app. 8,000) and Denmark (app. 6,500). The numbers of citizenship acquisitions have slightly decreased over the past years. This decrease is mainly attributed to the decreasing trend of naturalizations in the UK since 2010. In Denmark naturalization of Somalis dropped to almost zero in 2006. The numbers remain stable in Sweden and there is a slight increase observable in Norway.\textsuperscript{18}

**Conclusions**

Migration from Somalia to Europe has focused on a small number of European countries of destination, namely the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway. Thus, it shows two main patterns influencing its size and distribution between European countries. Immigration to the United Kingdom, which has close historical ties to Somalia, represents the more “traditional” migration pattern. The country still hosts the largest Somali community in Europe, both with regard to Somali nationals and naturalized Somalis, though recent years showed decreasing trends in immigration from the country. The second and more recent migration pattern refers to asylum applications in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. They volunteered to refugee resettlement programs already at the beginning of the Somali conflict. This “new” migration resulted in a considerable shift of Somali migration movements from the United Kingdom to Sweden, despite of the fact that overall immigration from Somalia to Europe remained comparatively stable over the last decade. Today, Sweden hosts the second largest Somali community in Europe.

The different conflicts in the country have forced more than 1 million Somalis to flee. The majority of these refugees remain in the region and only a small share of them reached Europe to seek refuge. Although there is hope that a resolution
to the conflict is close, the annual most recent application figures keep on being quite stable – as they did over the past ten years. On the short term, there will not be any changes and it is not easy to predict further developments. What cannot be excluded are shifts between European countries as main countries of destination of Somali refugees. Such a shift has been confirmed by available statistics for the past, it might occur again in the future. Finally, since a considerable percentage of migrants from Somalia settled down permanently, follow-up migration due to family reunification will play an important role in the years to come.

*Martin Hofmann is a Programme Manager in the Competence Centre for Legal Migration & Integration at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).*

*David Reichel is a Research Officer at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).*
Migration from Somalia to Europe – A Statistical Overview

1 Bradbury, Mark and Healy, Sally, A brief history of the Somali conflict, in: Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources 201, p. 10 -15
2 Sheik, Hassan and Healy, Sally, Somalia´s Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development, UNDP 2009, 6
3 AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK.
4 Own calculations based on Eurostat database, table migr_pop1ctz, data downloaded 5.2013
5 Statistics on persons born in Somalia were not always available for the year 2012. Therefore earlier years were used to estimate the number of immigrants from Somalia. Data on persons born in Somalia were not available for Germany, Estonia, Greece and Malta. For Germany and Malta the numbers of citizens of Somalia were used instead. Eurostat database, tables migr_pop1ctz and migr_pop3ctb, data extracted 3.2013
6 The Numbers refer to the year 2009, no recent statistics are available. Since there was a positive net immigration from Somalia to Austria in the years after 2009, we estimated the current number of migrants from Somalia at over 1,500. Please refer to migration flows by citizenship Statistik Austria (04.09.2012): Wanderungsstatistik, available at: www.statistik.at, accessed 5.2013
7 Own calculations based on Eurostat database, table migr_pop1ctz, data downloaded 5.2013
9 Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), accessed 16.5.2013
10 AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL (no data for 2012), NO, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK.
11 Source: Eurostat database, table migr_asyappctza, own calculations, accessed 5.2013
12 Own calculations based on Eurostat database, table migr_asyappctza (data downloaded 5.2013).
14 Own calculations based on data from Eurostat database, table migr_eiord, data extracted 5.2013
15 Own calculations based on data from Eurostat database, table migr_eiord, data extracted 5.2013
16 Own calculations based on data from Eurostat database, table migr_resvalid, data extracted 5.2013
17 Own calculations based on data from Eurostat database, table migr_acq, data extracted 5.2013
Irregular Somali Migration to Austria and Europe
Gerald Tatzgern

Introduction

This article deals with irregular migration flows from Somalia to Europe with special consideration given to Austria. The primary analysis is based on migration statistics by Statistics Austria, UNHCR and the asylum statistics of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior. The key data however, are derived from the Criminal Intelligence Service’s smuggling database. Based on these data sets, this paper offers quantitative explanatory approaches regarding the trends of irregular migration of Somalis. The aim of the article is to outline the extent of irregular Somali migration flows to Austria from 2003 to 2012,1 as well as forms and trends of Somalis smuggling to and within Austria.

Migration flow from Somalia to Austria

The forms of immigration from Somalia to Austria in the last decade occurred along three patterns of migration: legal immigration, forced migration and asylum migration, and irregular migration. The number of migrants stemming from forced and asylum migration, as well as legal immigration is being summarized on the basis of immigration and asylum statistics. However, the smuggling database only contains information regarding irregular migration.

In recent years, the majority of Somali immigrants who have migrated to Austria have been asylum seekers. From 2003 until 2012, Somalis have lodged 3,011 asylum applications in Austria. The years 2007 – 2012 showed an increase in applicants, with the year 2011 displaying an ultimate high with 610 applications by Somali asylum seekers.2 In contrast, legal immigration of Somali citizens took place on a lower level.3 Immigrants coming from Africa rarely choose Austria as a destination country. However, this does not apply to Somalia, as Somalis are the biggest group of Africans migrating to Austria.4

As discussed earlier, the time period between 2007 and 2012 showed an increase in Somali applicants. For clarification purposes, the years 2005 and 2006 will be added to the numeric overview:
In summary, 2005-2006 indicates an increase of 106% in Somali asylum claims lodged in Austria. Between 2006 and 2007, that number rose to 155% whereas between 2011 and 2012, an increase of 221% was reported.

During the same time period, between 2003 and 2012, the smuggling database contained 2,082 registered apprehended Somalis, whereas the total number of Somali asylum applicants stands at 3,011. The difference of the 929 persons stems from the fact that the smuggling database does not include three types of unauthorized entries: Children, which are born in Austria (“Nachgeborene”), subsequent asylum applications, and family reunifications.

**Migration flow 2003 - 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asylum claims by Somalis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, compared to other European countries, the total number of asylum applications lodged in Austria is relatively low. Although the years 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 indicate the highest applications ever lodged in Austria, Somali asylum seekers who chose Austria as their destination lodged a small number of those applications. For example, in 2011 Austria had the highest number of applications from Somalis, whereas the European Union registered a total of 11,407 asylum applications from Somali citizens, which represents 5.4% asylum applicants in Austria. All in all, the amount of asylum applications of Somali citizens in Austria did not surpass 6%, which suggests that in terms of asylum applications, Austria does not seem to be one of the top destinations for Somali refugees. Moreover, countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway have a much higher number of asylum applications by Somalis, while asylum seekers in Austria are overwhelmingly originating from the Russian Federation and Afghanistan.

**Characteristics of the apprehended Somalis**

As already mentioned, between 2003-2012, 2,082 apprehended Somali nationals were registered in the smuggling database. Approximately 85% of people apprehended were originally smuggled to Austria. Out of this number, 8% entered irregularly and 6% stayed irregularly in Austria. At the same time 1% were smugglers themselves.

**Age**

In the years 2003-2012, 91% of the apprehended persons were adults, whereas 9% were minors. Roughly 3% of the minors were under 14 years old, and 6% were between 14 and 18 years old. None of the minors under 14 years stayed irregularly in Austria while 94% of them were smuggled and 6% entered Austria irregularly. Around 2% of the minors aged 14 to 18 years stayed irregularly in Austria, whereas 87% were smuggled and 11% entered irregularly. The majority, 83% of the Somali adults were smuggled, 9% entered irregularly and 7% stayed irregularly in Austria and 1% were smugglers themselves.

**Gender**

Of the 2,082 apprehended persons mentioned, 1,588 (76%) were men, and only 494 (24%) women. However, 1,322 (83%) were smuggled men, 112 men (7%) stayed irregularly, and 131 (8%) of the males entered Austria irregularly. The remai-
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ning 23 (2%) were male smugglers. In total, 436 (88%) women were smuggled, 15 (3%) stayed irregularly, and 40 (8%) entered Austria irregularly. The remaining 3 (0.5%) were female smugglers.

Possible reasons for Somalis’ migration to Austria

As previously mentioned, the total number of apprehended and registered Somalis in the smuggling database between the years 2003-2012 was 2,082. The reasons to migrate differ, with only 94% actually indicating reasons for their migration to Austria. 53% claimed private reasons, 18% stated that they were escaping war-affected areas, 12% left for unknown reasons, while 11% stated they were fleeing the country for political reasons. Less important were economic reasons, family reunification, religious persecution or unemployment. It is important to mention that prostitution, prosecution and homeward journey were not listed as possible reasons for migration.

However, there is a clear correlation between the ongoing conflict in Somalia and the forced migration to Europe. While Somalia was the sixth largest source country of asylum seekers in 2007 with 12,300 claims within the European Union, one year later the number was 21,800, which represents an increase of 77 percent. Inevitably, in 2008 Somalia became the country of origin with the second highest number of asylum seekers in countries like Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. According to UNHCR this spike in numbers reflected the deteriorating situation in the country.

Smuggling Routes & Modus Operandi

The preferred smuggling route from Somalia, North Africa and partly from Afghanistan and Pakistan is through the central Mediterranean Sea. It begins via ships, mainly operating from Tunisia and Libya heading towards Malta and Italy. The preferred onward route is through Italy where alien-smugglers organize additional transports to West Europe. The numbers of apprehended persons and alien-smugglers in the Austrian province of Tyrol demonstrate the bottleneck of the “Brennerroute” to get to Austria or Germany.

However, a comparative analysis of the border crossings into Austria from 2003 to 2012 shows that Lower Austria and Burgenland have the largest share of apprehended Somalis. From the total of 2,082 apprehended Somalis 951 persons were apprehend in these two provinces. Noteworthy is that the biggest refugee camp – Traiskirchen
– and Vienna’s airport are located in the province of Lower Austria; both serve as first response centers. Therefore, Lower Austria has the highest number of border crossings by Somalis with 418 persons or 44%, followed by Burgenland with 235 irregular border crossings of Somali citizens which equal 25% and Tyrol with 16% which equals for 155 people. However, only 15 Somalis were registered in the capital of Vienna.

In 2003 the highest number of Somali apprehensions ever registered was 179, followed by 2011 and 2012 with 166 and 133 respectively.

**Modes of Transportation**

The mode of transportation to Austria was established in approximately 1,385 (67%) cases. Almost 37% used the plane to get to Austria, leaving a total of 18% arriving to Austria via train. The years 2007 and 2008 showed a particular increase in the mentioned modes of transportation. However, approximately 10% used a truck, 9% were smuggled by car, 9% were apprehended on foot and roughly 4% were using a bus, while other modes of transportation were unknown in 13% of the cases.

**Networks of traffickers & smuggling networks**

Only 1% of the Somali citizens act as alien-smugglers, which indicates that Somalia is not a priority nationality for alien-smugglers. According to the Organized Human Smuggling Report published by the Austrian Ministry of the Interior,¹⁰ the leading nationalities for organized smuggling are: Hungary with 27 smugglers, Serbia with 23 smugglers, Turkey with 21 smugglers, Russian Federation with 16 smugglers, and 15 smugglers were of Afghan descent. Overall, 25 Somalis operated as smugglers in Austria. Out them 23 were males and only 3 were women. All of them were adults. In comparison, in the year 2011 with a peak of asylum applications lodged in Austria, only 16 Somali alien-smugglers were detained.

In 2011, the majority of alien-smugglers captured in Lower Austria claimed economic reasons as motive for their activities. From 2003 to 2012 fifteen alien-smugglers were apprehended in Lower Austria, four in Vienna, two were caught in Tyrol, one in Upper Austria, one in Styria, one in Vorarlberg and one in Burgenland.

Colonel Gerald TATZGERN, M.A., is head of the Central Service for Combating Human Smuggling/Human Trafficking at the Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service.
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1. The years 2003-2012 were chosen as a basis for the analysis.


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Alex P. Schmid, Nico Prucha, Matthew Allatin

General Conflict Background

The region inhabited by Somali people was colonized by the British (1884) and the Italians (1889), and became independent in 1960. Somalia is an ethnically quite homogeneous country but has unfortunately been torn apart by rivalries among the six major clans (Dir, Isaaq, Darod, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyn) and numerous sub-clans. It is also religiously homogeneous as most people are Sunnis. For almost three decades, from 1969 to 1991, a dictator named Mohammed Siad Barre ruled the nation. The claim that terrorism and other forms of political violence are linked to weak or failing states has nowhere been truer than in the case of Somalia. Since the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, the country has been without an effective government, which best exemplifies it as a failed state. After the exile of Siad Barre, some thirty different warring groups fought for power, which resulted in a famine affecting up to two million people. Local warlords targeted a UN relief mission, and by 1995, UN troops were withdrawn. Part of the country in the northern region split off from the Somali Democratic Republic, and in 1991 formed the independent ‘Somaliland Republic’. Many Somalis have fled abroad, especially to Kenya where the refugee camps around Dadaab hold close to half a million displaced persons.

Since 2007, Somalia has become a sanctuary for Islamists from East Africa, Yemen and more distant places, including Europe. Al-Qaeda claimed that its first battlefield success against the United States occurred on October 3, 1993. The United States withdrew after 19 Marines had been killed in Mogadishu in an attempted raid to arrest followers of Muhammad Farah Aaidid. This bloody incident, a turning point for Somalia and US interventions, became known as ‘the battle for Mogadishu’ or ‘Black Hawk Down’. Osama Bin Laden was at that time in neighboring Sudan, an invited guest of Hasan al-Turabi (Bin Laden also married Turabi’s sister Maha) who had come to power with a military coup in 1989 by General Omar al-Bashir. The confrontation in Mogadishu between US marines who intended to capture a warlord and local gunmen led to the killing of 18 US troops and the wounding of more than 70. Bin Laden would later claim this as a victory of Al-Qaeda, saying that Al-Qaeda...
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operatives were among those who gave the US marines a bloody nose in the Black Hawk Down incident, in which two US helicopter gunships were hit and downed by RPG fire. One of Bin Laden’s body guards who became the first leader and main ideologue of AQ’s franchise in Saudi Arabia in 2003, Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, is said to have been among the AQ operatives.

The ‘battle for Mogadishu’ is outlined by Al-Qaeda propaganda as a practical test for future operations against the US Military, as this was the first time that the jihadists had a direct and hostile contact with the Americans. The battle against the American soldiers is contextualized as one of the first jihadi operations in Somalia:

“After the second Gulf-War [1991], America’s troops arrived in Somalia and killed 13,000 sons of the Muslims. When the lions of Islam, the Arab-Afghans, took aim and jumped [at the Americans], roaring with their brothers on this territory, they stomped the pride of the Americans in the mud, killing some of their soldiers, destroying their tanks, their [military] installations and shot a couple of their airplanes down. So America and her allies fled in a dark night. (…) The battle for Somalia was the first one where the Mujahideen faced America. In this battle they learned the truth about the US Army, testing their power, realizing their weaknesses of their combat strategies. The omnipotent myth of their army broke when confronted with a small troop of the Mujahideen. The experimentation with guerilla warfare in Somalia was a great success (…) it convinced several jihadi leaders regarding the possibility to confront the Americans.”

The north (Somaliland and Puntland) has de facto split off from the rest of Somalia. Sheik Sharif Ahmed has led the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and has mostly ruled in absentia by governing from Kenya and Djibouti. In 2010, once known as the breadbasket of the country, the region of Lower Shabelle suffered a severe famine as a result of the ongoing conflict in the region. Between 2010 and 2012 the famine claimed the lives of nearly 260,000 people. Ethiopian, Kenyan, Burundian, Ugandan, French and American foreign troops have intervened, partly under the flag of the African Union, which had 12,000 troops in the country as of 2012.

Al-Shabaab emerged in 2002. It was founded by Afghan veterans and in 2004 became the militant youth wing of the Islamic Court Union (ICU). In 2006, the ICU controlled large parts of central and southern Somalia. In late 2006 and early 2007, Ethiopian forces intervened and routed the Islamic Court Union militias. Yet the inter-
vention created a nationalist backlash from which Al-Shabaab profited; most of the Ethiopians withdrew in January 2009 and civil war resumed between Al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG – most of the time in exile) under Abdullah Yusuf and his local allies.\textsuperscript{9} Since then, Al-Shabaab has been very successful in extending its reach, at least until 2011, by using guerrilla and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government and the peacekeepers of the UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While many of Al-Shabaab’s clan-based fighters are mainly concerned with local issues, its leadership pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in September 2009. This pledge of allegiance, ba’ya in Arabic, was renewed by Bin Laden’s successor Ayman Al-Zawahiri in early February 2012.

Al-Shabaab directed its operation not only against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, its allies, NGOs and the African Union peacekeepers, but also carried the fight abroad to northern Kenya and to Uganda. There, it was responsible for two bombings of civilian spectators watching the World Cup Soccer Games in 2010. Supported by members of Somalia’s foreign diasporas as well as profiting from criminal activities and port taxes, Al-Shabaab has for nearly five years been able to withstand African Union troops and fights with local warlords.\textsuperscript{10} By early 2012, Al-Shabaab has experienced a crisis due to shortages of funds, fuel, and ammunition.\textsuperscript{11} There was also a popular backlash due to the way it reacted to the famine and its gruesome tactics. Al-Shabaab often recruits child soldiers through kidnapping. The group habitually kills its own wounded members, deserters, and anyone willing to criticize the organization.\textsuperscript{12} Currently, it has withdrawn from Mogadishu and some other key places it once occupied but it makes its presence felt through suicide attacks in the capital as well as other strategic places. Nevertheless it has been a resilient force that might yet see another comeback as it did after the first Ethiopian incursion in 2006.

**Profile**

**NAME(S)**

*English Name:*

Al-Shabaab\textsuperscript{13} (Youth in Arabic) or Imarat al-Islamiyya fi Somal (Islamic Emirate of Somalia).\textsuperscript{14}

*Original Name:*

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen /Mujahideen Youth Movement\textsuperscript{15}
The Al-Shabaab movement

Other Names:
Shabab, the Youth, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement, Hizbul Shabab, Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, Youth Wing, Al-Shabaab al Islam, Al-Shabaab al Jihaad, the Unity of Islamic Youth

Locally known as the “veiled men” due to the red scarves around their faces to hide their identity and project an intimidating appearance.

Year of Origin:
Al-Shabaab was established in 2006 but its origins date back to 2002 when four veterans of Al-Qaeda (Ahmad Abdi Aw Muhammad Godane aka Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr, Ibrahim Haji Jamaa al-Afghani, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali aka Abu Mansur, and Aden Hashi Farah Ayro aka Abu Muhsen al-Ansari, all returned from Afghanistan). Before 2006, it was a militia that took order from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). When Ethiopia intervened in December 2006, and drove the leaders of the UIC away, Al-Shabaab became the rallying point for national resistance, fighting the invaders until they withdrew in late 2008. It was only in August 2011 that thanks to AMISOM, Mogadishu could be recaptured.

Ideology
Its goal is the establishment of an Islamist Emirate based on shariah law not just in Somalia but including the parts of Ethiopia and Kenya inhabited by Somalis. It shares an ideological tie with Al-Qaeda, implementing the authoritative rulings and interpretations and rejects the local Sufi customs in Somalia, declaring these as apostasy (ridda) of Islam and as shirk (polytheism). An Al-Shabaab spokesman, Abu Mansour Mukhtar Robow, indicated that Al-Shabaab rejects all forms of governance other than shariah law. In a statement in 2008, Robow said that the group seeks to establish an Islamic state through jihad against the apostates and regimes aiding the Crusaders’ proxy war against Muslims. The statement, entitled “declaration of the campaign” “our praised terrorism”, reacting to the idol of our age, America” is a direct response to the US State Department’s determination of listing Al-Shabaab as a terror organization. Al-Shabaab in the statement describes itself as the Somali part of Jihadists who are fighting the United States on the Horn of Africa, “who play the greatest role since the ousting of Siad Barre”. The pledge is to “confront the Ethiopian Crusaders in Somalia, who rely on American spy aircraft deployed in the skies of Somalia, responsible for bombing our villages without precedence.” The
goal is clearly outlined in this statement of 2008, for “we [al-Shabaab] will give our homeland for Islam and for the Qur’an as an [Islamic] state; we hope our territory will empower [our] religion and satisfy the Lord of the Worlds in the sky.” Furthermore, to emphasize their reaction to the US State Department, all “Mujahideen who are on the list of terrorists by the Americans” are addressed as brothers and stressed to endure on their missions for jihadi quests.

Here are some typical statements:\textsuperscript{23}

- In August 2008, Al-Shabaab released a video statement by Al-Qaeda in East Africa network where operatives Saleh Nabhan and Robow appear. In the video Nabhan pledges allegiance to Osama bin Laden, encourages Muslim youth everywhere to go to Somalia to wage jihad and showed training footage of instructing recruits at an Al-Shabaab training camp in Somalia.\textsuperscript{24}

- A September 2008 statement issued at the end of Ramadan by the Al-Qaeda linked Dawn Media Centre offered seasonal greetings to jihadist leaders and placed its spokesman Robow on almost equal footing alongside prominent jihadist leaders including Osama bin Laden and his at the time deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. It referred to them as “our leads, sheikhs and emirs.”\textsuperscript{25} Leader (qa’id) is a reference to acknowledging the AQ hierarchy after the pledge of allegiance, while “sheikh” denotes bin Laden and Al Zawahiri as religious authorities who are also formerly in charge of military affairs (amir).

- Following the May 2008 missile strike that killed prominent Al-Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayrow, spokesman Robow vowed revenge for his death by attacking Western interests.\textsuperscript{26}

- February 2012 statement issued by Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, announced that Al-Shabaab formally joined Al-Qaeda and pledged its support to Ayman Al Zawahiri.\textsuperscript{27}

**Main Goals/Aims**

Al-Shabaab’s main goal is the creation of an Islamic state in Somalia by clearing the country of foreigners and Western influences.\textsuperscript{28} The leaders of Al-Shabaab also support Al-Qaeda’s global ambitions, in addition to regional goals.\textsuperscript{29}
The Al-Shabaab movement

Structure

An 85 members council runs the group, about half of which are local Somalis from various local clans. Al-Shabaab has a loose leadership structure with a number of regional factions and commanders. The group is divided into three geographic regions with each region controlled by one unit, Bay & Bakool, South Central Somalia & Mogadishu, and Puntland & Somaliland. A fourth region, the Juba Valley, is controlled by a unit that is not considered an official part of the structure but nevertheless works very closely with the other units and the overall leadership. Al-Shabaab has a religious council made of Shariah Courts supported by an Islamic police force named Jaysh al-Hisba.

Leadership (past and current):

The group is said to be lead nominally by Ahmad Abdi Aw Muhammed Godane (aka Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman, aka Abu Zubeyr). The group’s actions are overviewed by a senior council for guidance. Godane’s predecessor was Moa-lim Aden Hashi Ayro, an Afghan veteran who was killed by an US airstrike in 2008. Abu Zubeyr founded the original Al-Shabaab in 2002, together with Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, Inrahim Haji Jamaa al-Afghani and Mukhtar Robow, (aka Abu Mansur) who became the group’s chief spokesman. Abu Mansur al-Amriki (aka Omar Shafik Hammami), a field commander, oversaw the control of South Central Somalia. Al-Amriki decided to split off from the group and as of June 2013, is presumed dead. The Somaliland and Puntland field commander was Jibrahim Haji Jama ‘al Afghani’. The Juba Valley field commander is Hassan Abdillahi Hersi ‘al Turki’.

Membership Estimates (Analyst):

Estimates of Al-Shabaab’s membership vary over time and usually range between 3,000 and 7,000 members. However, a March 2012 report out of Somalia provided higher membership figures. Group membership was listed at 14,426, breaking down as follows:

- 4,230 originate from the Rahanwein tribe
- 3,106 originate from the Darod tribe
- 2,401 originate from the Hawiye tribe
- 1,702 originate from the Dir tribe
- 1,005 originate from minority clans in Somalia who are students & farmers.
This source furthermore refers to 1,982 foreign Al-Qaeda fighters, a figure that is subject to discussion. Their influence is substantial as in the decision-making central shura council where foreigners held 42 seats among a total of 85 members. At one time, its security chief Abu Musa Mombasa was a Pakistani, its finance minister Abu Fayad was a Saudi and one of its commanders, Nilal al-Berjawi was born in West London. Hundreds of Somalis from Britain, the United States, Germany, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Sweden have joined Al-Shabaab. The late chief of MI-5 in the United Kingdom, Jonathan Evans, warned that “it’s only a matter of time before we see terrorism on our streets inspired by those who are today fighting alongside Al-Shabaab”.42

**Membership Estimate (official)**

According to the US Department of State, precise numbers are unavailable. However, it appears that Al-Shabaab has to rely increasingly on foreign fighters to supplement its dwindling numbers (ca. 3,000) of indigenous warriors and terrorists. Foreign fighters come from the Somali diaspora but also include jihadists from Iraq, Pakistan, India, North America and Europe.43

**Estimated death toll**

Figures are sketchy and incomplete. The American Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland in March 2012 lists a figure of 650 dead and 788 wounded due to Al-Shabaab attacks.44 This is probably a gross underestimate, especially in the light of the indirect victims (due to displacement, lack of medical services and famine) running into tens of thousands.

Between 2010 and 2012, an estimated 260,000 Somalis died due to drought, conflict and famine, chiefly in the central and southern areas controlled by Al-Shabaab.45 In 2011 Al-Shabaab had banned the UN, UNICEF, the WHO as well as nearly a dozen NGOs from operating in the country, charging them with ‘crimes’ like the spread of democracy and secularism. On January 30, 2012, Al-Shabaab issued a statement justifying the “Closure of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)”, claiming that the Red Cross would deliberately distribute poisoned and expired food to women and children. By late 2011, some 3.6 million Somalis had become dependent on foreign food aid.46
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Internet presence

Al-Shabaab maintains a presence online, and had maintained several websites, mainly kataaib.info, later: al-kataaib.ws, while their main online forum was al-Qimmah.net. Both sites are down and unavailable. Al-Shabaab is very adept in using social media and other forms of the internet - even Twitter. The Somalia-based Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen are relying on Twitter to publish pictures, statements, and links to YouTube jihadi videos primarily in Arabic and English. Twitter was used by Al-Shabaab to update their followers regarding the failed French operation to free Denis Allex, who had been kidnapped by the group in 2009. Pictures of an alleged killed French special operative and his gear had been put on Twitter and Facebook, the statement claiming the revenge execution of the hostage was exclusively claimed on Twitter by the “HSM Press Office (@HSMPress).” Al-Shabaab publishes a ‘newspaper’ announcing its recent attacks and operations in Arabic. This ‘newspaper’, Shahada al-Ikhbariya is disseminated via Twitter, Facebook, and the classical jihadi online forums. The English side of Al-Shabaab’s propaganda outlet, mainly used via its English “press account” on Twitter, linking to its mainly Arabic videos and pictures in general, has the intention to address Muslims in the West and to lure them to Somalia and more so to join the frontlines of the jihad. Some jihadi videos published by Al-Shabaab have English subtitles or even feature fighters from the UK, speaking in their British accent to the audience with the intention to incite fellow Somali-British Muslims to join.

The main online operational cohesion, however, is via the jihadi Arabic language forums and the respective Twitter accounts. As jihadi forums remain operational and relatively stable most of the time, Al-Shabaab publishes all of its statements and declarations within the forums and parallel on Twitter and the social media in general.

Effect of past and current counter-terrorist measures

Counter-terrorism efforts against the group until 2012 were limited in their effect as Al-Shabaab exercises control over central and southern Somalia. More recent counter terrorism efforts by the former Somali Government (TFG) and African Union forces (AMISOM) forced Al-Shabaab to retreat from Mogadishu. Some 300 of its foreign fighters withdrew to Yemen. Recent offensives against Al-Shabaab by AMISOM were aided by support from the United States and France offering the TFG and AMISOM intelligence and special operations personnel.
Activities

Recent Tactics/Modus Operandi:
Al-Shabaab’s tactics have evolved over time, as they began fighting using traditional guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings, shootings and targeted assassinations.59 Its main strongholds until 2012 were in the center and south of the country (Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle and the port of Kismayo). However, it also conducted operations into Puntland and Somaliland in the north, two regions practically independent. Additionally, it also conducted terrorist operations in Uganda and Kenya as well as Yemen and Lebanon.60 As camouflage for their attacks, Al-Shabaab fighters frequently use uniforms of the enemy for infiltration before attacks.61 To subdue the local population, amputations and stoning are among the tactics used. These punishing sentences are framed as the proper implementation of shariah law and are mainly conducted by its policing unit, the Jaysh al-Hisba. One case that received wider news coverage was the stoning to death of the 13-year old girl Asho Duhalow, who had been raped.62

Location/Area(s) of Operation:
The major areas of operation are within Somalia, more specifically the regions where Al-Shabaab units operate (south central Somalia, Bay/Bakool regions and Juba Valley).63 Kismayo, the country’s second city, was, until late 2012, under their control. In August 2011, they withdrew from Mogadishu after coming under pressure by troops from the African Union.

Al-Shabaab has shown a capacity to strike outside of Somalia, e.g. when executing twin suicide bombings in Uganda’s capital Kampala killing 76 people watching the World Cup soccer final in July 2010.64 The group claimed immediate responsibility for the attack on July 14, 2010, and published a statement via its media group al-Kata’ib that was released online on the jihadist forums and social media. The Kampala operation is outlined as a revenge act for Uganda’s participation and commitment with the African Union Forces combatting Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab had various ministries and departments, e.g. one to track the activities of foreign NGOs, another for kidnapping foreign workers for ransom, yet another was in charge of supervising ‘assassinations’ and one served to ‘liaising with the pirates’.65
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Main Target(s): direct victims, symbolic targets, government(s):
The group has attacked a variety of targets. The targets include both local governments (Somali Transitional Government) as well as the military forces. Since 2007, Al-Shabaab has managed to establish an area of control in southern and central Somalia from which it made forays into adjacent territories. It has carried out bomb attacks and suicide operations in Kenya and Uganda as punishment for their participation in AMISOM, and the UN supported African Union peacekeeping mission. Al-Shabaab’s propaganda departments claim their success frequently by exhibiting killed or captured soldiers of the AU. Captured soldiers are forced to confess their ‘crimes’, the corruption of their leaders on camera and are in some cases executed or used as a token to exercise pressure on their respective governments. For example, Kenyan soldiers are forced to state the nature of their engagement in Somalia and demand that their government shall meet the conditions set by Al-Shabaab for their release.66

Al-Shabaab has also kidnapped tourists in Kenya as well as taken control over UNICEF and WHO distribution points in Somalia. The mixture of strategies comprising of assassinations, suicide-attacks and improvised explosive devices are key elements of the asymmetric fighting repertoire of Al-Shabaab.

Assessment of effectiveness of activities:
Their activities were initially successful as they were able to control a large section of the country, including coastal ports, airfields and large parts of the capital Mogadishu. Recent (2011-13) counter offensives by the Somali government and its allies have put Al-Shabaab on the defense and it has retreating back into southern Somalia.67 It termed the push out of Mogadishu (August 2011) a “strategic withdrawal” of its forces, trying to conceal their defeat by claiming an increase of activity in the Somali rural areas as well as the countryside.68

While declining as a guerrilla force, Al-Shabaab has maintained its capacity to engage in terrorist bombing, including vehicle-based suicide attacks in Mogadishu. Its recruiters and armed men occupy refugee camps both at home and in Kenya. It has supporters and operatives in places as far away as Canada, the United Kingdom and support of Somali Diaspora members in the United States.
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Operations (Chronology of main attacks - incl. failed and foiled)

Domestic

• Various raids, ambushes, roadside bombings and assassinations of Somali government officials and African Union troops in an insurgency setting similar to that of Iraq or Afghanistan: More notable domestic attacks:

  o January 2008 – Suicide car bombing near an African Union base – 13 killed;
  o February 2008 – Twin car bombings in the port city of Bossaso – 25 killed, at least 70 injured;
  o September 2008 – Attack on Somalia´s presidential compound – 15 killed, 25 injured;
  o October 2008 – Mortar attack aimed at presidential palace in Mogadishu struck a marketplace – 17 killed;
  o October 2008 – Coordinated suicide bombings at the UN compound, Ethiopian consulate and Presidential palace in Hargeysa – 24 killed;
  o February 2009 – Suicide car bombings against an African Union military base in Mogadishu – 11 killed;
  o June 2009 (18th): a bomb in Beledweyne killed TFG Security Minister Omar Hashi Aden and 34 other people;
  o December 2009 (3rd): 3 government ministers and 32 others died in suicide bombing attack on Hotel Shamo in Mogadishu;
  o August 2010 – Suicide bombing and raid of a Mogadishu hotel near presidential palace – 32 killed, at least 40 injured.69
  o October 2011: nearly 100 people killed in suicide bombing on the Ministry of Education in Mogadishu.70

Operations: international/transnational/cross-border:

• Al-Shabaab has conducted a limited number of operations outside of Somalia. Three notable attacks/plots identified are listed below:

  o August 2009 – individuals linked to Al-Shabaab attempted to attack an Australian military base in Sydney, Australia; the plot was disrupted before attack could take place.
January 2010 – individual linked to Al-Shabaab attempted to attack a Danish cartoonist who had drawn a picture of the Prophet Mohammed – the cartoonist escaped and the attacker was arrested in Copenhagen, Denmark.

July 2010 – Twin bombings of venues where crowds gathered to watch the World Cup finals in Kenya – 74 killed, 85 injured.

Al-Shabaab also sent 700 fighters to Hezbollah to battle Israel in Lebanon in July 2006; only 105 survivors returned.

**Support**

**Political Affiliation:**

As mentioned above, the ideology of Al-Shabaab is one that follows a strict form of Salafism in its proximity to the ideology of global Jihadism under the auspices of Al-Qaeda. Below this veneer of religion, however, are more mundane issues linked to politics and plunder.

**Links with Other Groups:**

Al-Shabaab associates with ideologically similar groups, most notably Al-Qaeda central, AQAP and, more recently, Boko Haram in Nigeria. The group has well publicized links to Al-Qaeda, with its senior members having trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The links between the groups are with individual members (through their training) but the organizational linkage between the two is weak. More specifically, members have received training in specific weapons & tactics but there is no direction coming from Al-Qaeda Central to dictate day-to-day Al-Shabaab operations. The strongest ties between the two groups are ideological, as they both share the same jihadist ideology. On a more regional basis, interaction and collaboration with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been identified. The arrest and indictment of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame helped to unearth interaction between the two groups, with Warsame acting as their conduit. Warsame was indicted for helping broker a weapons deal that benefited both groups, received training from AQAP and then shared that training with Al-Shabaab.

Recent developments indicate Al-Shabaab is willing to share their facilities with other jihadist groups to increase their proficiency. The Nigerian jihadist based group Boko Haram was responsible for the August 2011 bombing of the UN Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria and has in recent hostage videos issued a similar justification re-
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nowned to the global jihadist agenda. The investigation into the bombing found that one of the attackers had traveled to Somalia to prepare for the attack. The findings confirm recent statements from the US Military commanders that Boko Haram was working with Al-Shabaab and other African based jihadist groups. This cooperation can be expected to continue and will cause problems for Nigeria as Boko Haram gains better training from Al-Shabaab and might increase the lethality of their attacks.

External state & non-state (diaspora) support:
Al-Shabaab receives support from both state actors and non-state actors. Their primary state supporter is the country of Eritrea. Investigations into Al-Shabaab by the United States and United Nations determined Eritrea was instrumental in funneling weapons, money and other supplies to Al-Shabaab. Some of the weapons were of Iranian origin. Eritrea was confronted in 2009 for its support of Al-Shabaab and threatened with sanctions. Non-state support for Al-Shabaab comes from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and includes weapons, fighters and training since the two groups established a wider alliance. Somalia is not far off the South Yemeni Coast, where AQAP has strong footing in the Aden and Abyan provinces.

Sources of Funding:
Al-Shabaab receives funding from a variety of sources, the largest of which being the Somali Diaspora. The remittances from Somalis abroad are said to amount to an estimated USD 1 billion each year. The majority of this money is used to fund legitimate social services; yet some of this money is diverted to Al-Shabaab for military operations. Additional reports indicate Al-Shabaab managed to access funding from the United Nations World Food Program (through Somali businessmen), sympathetic Islamic Charities and by extortion of Somali businesses. According to the UN, extortion from local businesses in the Bakara and Suuq Baad markets yielded USD 60 million annually to Al-Shabaab. There have also been reports that Al-Shabaab received 20 percent of the proceeds of Somali pirates. The Eritrean government also supports Al-Shabaab, both in terms of weapons and money.
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Arms

Source(s) of Arms:
As was stated earlier, support from Eritrea and AQAP in Yemen are the main sources of weapons for Al-Shabaab at this point in time. However, there are indications that Iran has also been supplying arms.95

Types of Weapons:
The majority of Al-Shabaab weapons are small and light weapons including machine guns, handguns, man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and RPGs.96 Their weaponry consists mainly of outdated Soviet weapon systems and has been augmented by recent changes in tactics. The renewed tactics include “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs), so-called roadside bombs, and also an increase of suicide bombers in the past years.97 On 23 March 2007, a surface-to-air missile brought down an Ilyushin-76 airplane near Mogadishu airport. A common weapon of choice for Somali conflict parties is called “technicals”, a customized pick-up truck mounted with anti-aircraft or heavy machine guns. Al-Shabaab has also mounted such weapons on speedboats.

Trend Assessment

Al-Shabaab’s ideological goal of establishing shariah law in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa is likely to continue to dominate its actions. It will continue hit-and-run attacks against the Somali government and African peacekeepers in the hope of regaining the initiative and drive them out of Somalia. External attacks against civilian targets could expand as they lose ground in Somalia and foreign Diasporas might be utilized to punish foreign supporters of the Somali government. Since Al-Shabaab’s ability to attack Somali government supporters abroad is limited, the majority of their attacks are likely to occur domestically.

Recent reports have identified a number of weaknesses within Al-Shabaab. The famine affecting Somalia has been causing an internal strife, as Al-Shabaab was unable to provide basic needs for people within its territory and has been seen as a cause of the mass starvation.98 This has also caused friction with the Somali diaspora, their major support base.99 Since 2011 there has been a decline in the support from the Somali population. Part of Al-Shabaab has not completely internalized the transna-
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tional jihadist ideology of the leadership. Clan rivalry differences continue to weaken Al-Shabaab. There have been numerous defections in recent years, weakening Al-Shabaab as a fighting force.

Since mid-2011, Al-Shabaab has been hard-pressed as the African Union force (AMISOM), Ethiopian and Kenyan troops have pushed towards its heartland in southern Somalia. While foreign military intervention had in the past led to a nationalist backlash, this was less the case in 2012 when Al-Shabaab prevented some of the famine relief efforts to reach affected populations. Its recruitment tactics – basically kidnapping – have turned off many youngsters. The Wahhabi-type Shariah regime imposed on areas controlled by Al-Shabaab is unpopular with many of the Sufi-influenced traditional Muslims. However, the endgame is nowhere in sight. After so much warlordism and two decades of internecine fighting, making peace is not easy. While Al-Shabaab was pushed out of Mogadishu, the capital is still dangerous as suicide bombers infiltrate the town and IEDs are placed on roadsides.

Due to the presence of diasporas in Europe, North America, and to the West, Al-Shabaab still presents a serious regional security threat. Its activities have led to the displacement of two million people – one million internally, one million externally, many of them in Kenya. Its ability to recruit western citizens (either physically or online) in combination with past actions of attacking Somali government supporters remains a source of concern. While many of its fighters have deserted and others have pushed north and crossed into Yemen, there are still sizeable areas in central and southern Somalia under its control. Much of the local population appears to be disenchanted with Al-Shabaab, rejecting the strict Shariah-rule. For a time, after 2006, Al-Shabaab appeared to bring a small dosage of stability and order to a country torn apart by a decade of warfare. However, Al-Shabaab was unable to provide services to the communities. In areas it controlled, the drought turned into a famine due to Al-Shabaab's refusal to accept outside help. Clan rivalries still play havoc in the country and members of other than the major clans still see membership in Al-Shabaab as a viable alternative to marginal positions in the clan system. Al-Shabaab's ability to portray the conflict as one of defending Islam against Christian invaders (many of the African Union soldiers are Christians) still appeals to sections of the population.
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Prof. em. Dr. Alex P. Schmid is Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), Editor-in-Chief of its online journal “Perspectives on Terrorism” and Fellow of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT, The Hague).

Nico Prucha is a Research Associate at the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and a fellow of the Institute for Peace Research and Security at the University of Hamburg, Germany.

Matthew Alattin is a Research Assistant at the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and an Intelligence Analyst for Travelers Investigative Services (TIS) in the United States.
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5 Ibid.
7 BBC News Africa, Q & A: Who are Somalia’s Al-Shabaab? 17.10.2011
8 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism. Shabab. London: Jane’s, 8.11.2011
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33 Council on Foreign Relations: Backgrounder Al-Shabaab; March 2012:
34 Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore; Al-Shabaab, August 2011 http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/
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44 Global Terrorism Database; 3.2012; http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=20036&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

45 Report of Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FewsNet); cit. BBC, 2 May 2013.


48 As of mid-2010 this had been a mirrored address.

49 http://www.alqimmah.net.


52 The Facebook link to HSM’s Arabic media account, Wakala shahada al-ikhbariyya, circulated on Twitter with the intention to gain traction to the Facebook account, http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=1050347&l=f3ee046c97&id=357503417665041.

53 HSM Press Office, “PRESS RELEASE: Dennis [sic] Allex: an Agent Betrayed,” published on Twitter as a link to TwitLonger, http://www.twitlonger.com/show/knkqp9. This “press release”, claiming the execution of Denis Allex went online on January 16, four days after the French attempt to free the hostage. It further states “the death of the two French soldiers pales into insignificance besides the dozens of Muslim civilians senselessly killed by the French forces during the operation. Avenging the deaths of these civilians and taking into consideration France’s increasing persecution of Muslims around the world, its oppressive anti-Islam policies at home, French military operations in the war against Islamic Shari’ah in Afghanistan and, most recently, in Mali, and its continued economic, political and military assistance towards the African invaders in Muslim lands, Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen has reached a unanimous decision to execute the French intelligence officer, Dennis Allex.” In a similar reasoning as the Woolwich attack, the foreign policy


55 National Counter Terrorism Center – Al-Shabaab


57 MSNBC Somalia: A Year of Progress, as 300 Al-Shabaab flee;

58 UPI Special Report.

59 Council on Foreign Relations: Backgrounder Al-Shabaab


61 Ibid.


63 Council on Foreign Relations: Backgrounder Al-Shabaab
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64 Council on Foreign Relations: Backgrounder Al-Shabaab
66 In their filmed statements (February 23, 2012), a video beginning with Quran 47:4 that is used oftentimes in connection with hostages and prisoners, one captured soldier states: “My release, it depends on the action of the Kenyan people and also on the action of the Kenyan government. I would like to appeal to my president. How many Kenyans are we willing to sacrifice?”
67 MSNBC: Somalia A Year of Progress, as 300 Al-Shabaab flee
70 Abdel Bari Atwan. After Bin Laden, op. cit., p.112.
73 Council for Foreign Relations – Al-Shabaab
74 Council for Foreign Relations – Al-Shabaab
75 Council for Foreign Relations – Al-Shabaab
76 Council for Foreign Relations – Al-Shabaab
78 United States Department of Justice - “Accused Al-Shabaab Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”
79 United States Department of Justice – “”Accused Al-Shabaab Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”
82 Bashir Adigun, Jon Gambrell “Nigeria hunts al-Qaida-linked man in UN HQ bombing”
84 The Australian “Eritrea warned on Al-Shabaab links”
85 The Australian “Eritrea warned on Al-Shabaab links”
87 Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore – Al-Shabaab
88 Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore – Al-Shabaab
90 Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore – Al-Shabaab
92 Mike Pflanz “Somalia famine could cause militant Al-Shabaab group to splinter”.
94 Abdel Bari Atwan. After Bin Laden, op. cit., p. 117.
96 Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore – Al-Shabaab
97 Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore – Al-Shabaab
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98 Mike Pfianz “Somalia famine could cause militant Al-Shabaab group to splinter”
99 Mike Pfianz “Somalia famine could cause militant Al-Shabaab group to splinter”
100 Council on Foreign Relations – Al-Shabaab
101 Mike Pfianz “Somalia famine could cause militant Al-Shabaab group to splinter”